# Repository deep-audit report

Date: 2026-08-10
Revised: 2026-08-11, a verification pass over every cited line. Six claims were
wrong as first written and are corrected in place. Two findings were added.

Frozen 2026-08-11, V-674. A dated measurement is never edited after the day,
and that holds for a finding which later gets fixed. The live state of each one
sits in `docs/caveats/` with its task id. The fix sits in the subsystem's living
doc under `docs/`. Read this file for the evidence, not for what is still true.

Read-only audit complete. I found **20 issue-specific candidates not represented by a matching Vikunja task**: **3 High, 15 Medium, 2 Low**. No code or Vikunja tasks were changed.

I compared all 366 tasks in Maven project 2. Existing items such as V-317, V-589, V-597, V-603, V-605, V-608, V-643 and V-647 were excluded except where a new finding is clearly separate.

## 1. Unhandled edge cases and silent failures

### Empty STT responses suppress the local fallback

**A — Location:** `internal/stt/http.go:85` accepts `{}` as a successful transcript and returns empty text at line 89. `internal/stt/pair.go:143` only falls back when `err != nil`.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A malformed `200 OK` from the workstation silently drops a voice turn instead of invoking `mavsttd`.

**C — Proposed fix:** Require nonblank transcript text and a valid confidence range; treat missing required fields as an error so `Pair` falls back. Bound the response decoder and add `{}`, `{"text":""}`, oversized-body and invalid-confidence tests.

### Open-Meteo can report invented zero-degree weather

**A — Location:** `internal/weather/openmeteo.go:47` uses value fields, while line 95 accepts `{}` and line 100 interprets it as WMO 0 and 0°C.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A valid JSON error/degraded response becomes plausible but false weather. This is separate from V-589, which covered HTTP status handling.

**C — Proposed fix:** Make `current_weather` and its required members pointer/nullable fields, validate presence and ranges, and cap both forecast and geocoder bodies.

### Dialogue persistence errors disappear completely

**A — Location:** Corrupt rows are silently skipped at `internal/dialogue/session.go:127`; delete failures are discarded at line 191; marshal and save failures are swallowed at lines 201 and 209.

**B — Severity:** Medium. Restart continuity can silently vanish, while failed deletes can resurrect stale conversation state.

**C — Proposed fix:** Return or report persistence errors with session ID and operation; quarantine/delete corrupt rows; use bounded contexts instead of `context.Background()`. Keep current-turn availability, but expose the lost restart guarantee through logs/metrics.

## 2. Concurrency and race conditions

### Reminder state transition is a read-then-write lost update

**A — Location:** `internal/store/reminders.go:172` reads `pending`, then line 182 updates without checking the old state.

**B — Severity:** Medium now; High once V-622 adds cancellation surfaces. Concurrent fire/cancel operations can both succeed and the last writer wins. This invariant is not described in V-622.

**C — Proposed fix:** Use one conditional statement: `UPDATE ... WHERE id=? AND status='pending'`; inspect `RowsAffected`, then distinguish not-found from invalid transition. Add simultaneous fired/cancelled tests under `-race`.

### TCP listener shutdown can leave `Accept` blocked forever

**A — Location:** `internal/netaddr/netaddr.go:180` waits only on `conns` and `errc`. During close, line 201 may select the already-closed `done` branch without publishing the listener error; `Close` at line 225 does not wake `Accept`.

**B — Severity:** Medium. During close both `errc` and `done` are ready in `acceptLoop`'s select and Go picks uniformly, so roughly one close in two strands a waiting `Accept` forever on a TCP seam.

**C — Proposed fix:** Add `case <-l.done: return nil, net.ErrClosed` to `Accept`, and make error/channel closure ownership explicit. Test an in-flight `Accept` concurrently with `Close`.

## 3. Data fetching: waterfalls and duplicated scans

### Fact enrichment performs a serial 20-call network waterfall

**A — Location:** `cmd/mavend/factenrichment.go:160` resolves each fact sequentially; line 223 makes the Nexus call. Each request can consume ten seconds at `cmd/mavend/ecosystem.go:63`.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A slow-but-reachable Nexus can hold one tick for roughly 20 × 10s, preventing the worker from observing its intended interval. V-647 only covered the duplicate queue scan.

**C — Proposed fix:** Prefer a Nexus batch-resolution endpoint. Otherwise use bounded concurrency, such as four workers, while preserving per-fact backoff and the 20-attempt ceiling.

### A recall miss scans two whole tables

**A — Location:** The query source table runs embed, memory and notes in order at `cmd/mavend/actions_query.go:161` through line 164. `MemoryStore.Search` scans every row of `memory_vectors` at `internal/store/memory.go:82`; a miss then calls the legacy notes query at `cmd/mavend/actions_query.go:718`, which decodes every note vector at `internal/store/notes.go:63` and sorts the whole table at line 69.

**B — Severity:** Medium at scale. This is not an N+1. It is two full scans per missed recall. The memory scan is already cheap per losing row on purpose, costing one dot product read off the stored bytes with no `[]float32` materialized, so the duplicated decode cost is the notes path alone. Both recall widths are tiny (`memoryRecallWidth` 3, `noteRecallWidth` 5), so the work is in the scan, not the result set. V-581 is a generic sweep of this file, but does not identify this issue.

**C — Proposed fix:** Establish the invariant that every recallable note exists in `memory_vectors`, then remove the fallback. `internal/store/backfill.go` already rewrites note rows into the unified index, so the backfill exists; what is missing is proof that the two exclusion filters agree, since `QueryNotes` filters on `notHisWordsSQL` while `Search` filters on `memory.NonRecallPrefix`. Until they do, query only notes missing from the unified index and rank with the existing bounded top-K heap.

## 4. Dependency health and version pinning

### Reachable published vulnerabilities in the pinned toolchain and `x/text`

**A — Location:** `go.mod:3` and `Makefile:7` pin Go 1.25.5; `go.mod:25` pins `x/text` 0.14.0. Reachable traces include normalization at `internal/router/onnxembedder.go:364`, HTML rendering at `cmd/mavweb/shell.go:154`, email header decoding at `internal/email/message.go:244`, and reverse proxying at `cmd/mavgpud/main.go:212`.

**B — Severity:** High. `govulncheck` found **20 reachable advisories**: one in `x/text` and 19 in the Go standard library, including template XSS, parser complexity/DoS and TLS issues. The official database says `x/text` before 0.39.0 can loop on invalid UTF-8; Go 1.25.12 contains the accumulated security corrections. See [GO-2026-5970](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5970), [GO-2026-4980](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4980), and the [Go release history](https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.25.0).

**C — Proposed fix:** Upgrade the vendored toolchain to at least 1.25.12, preferably current 1.26.5 after compatibility testing; upgrade `x/text` to at least 0.39.0/current 0.40.0; tidy and re-vendor. Add `govulncheck ./...` to the repository gate.

No dependency was three major versions behind. The remaining direct updates were minor/patch releases. `.opencode`'s `npm audit` reported zero vulnerabilities and no peer conflicts.

## 5. Security exposure

### WebAuthn enrollment is open and step-up state is process-global

**A — Location:** Registration endpoints have no existing-credential or bootstrap authorization at `cmd/mavweb/webauthn.go:92` and line 103. `RegisterBegin` also answers GET, while `RegisterFinish` requires POST. A single server-wide session is created at `cmd/mavweb/main.go:170`, backed by one `assertedAt` timestamp at `internal/webauthn/session.go:20`. The voice WebSocket accepts every origin at `cmd/mavweb/voiceproxy.go:48`.

**B — Severity:** High, and scoped to enrollment and session binding. Assertion itself is sound. `internal/webauthn/webauthn.go:221` requests `userVerification: "required"`, and line 304 rejects a sign count that did not increase. What is broken is that any client past the reverse proxy can enroll its own key, and that after any successful assertion every client inherits the same five-minute step-up window. The wildcard WebSocket origin makes cross-site use easier. V-317 covers which routes are gated, and V-605 covers challenge-map growth, not enrollment or session binding.

**C — Proposed fix:** Permit first enrollment only through a local/one-time bootstrap ceremony; require an already-authenticated credential for subsequent enrollment. Bind step-up to a signed, HttpOnly, SameSite browser session and exact RP origin. Restrict WebSocket origins and add CSRF/origin validation to mutating routes.

### `mavgpud` exposes an unauthenticated GPU/model proxy on the LAN

**Closed 2026-08-11, V-673.** The reasoning now lives in `docs/offload.md`,
beside the rest of the workstation seam, and `docs/deployment.md` carries the
operational line in the daemon table. This block is a pointer, not a second
home: read those, not this.

- Boundary and limits: `cmd/mavgpud/auth.go`, wired in `cmd/mavgpud/main.go`.
- Client half: `internal/llm/client.go`, `internal/llm/remote.go`,
  `internal/config/workstation.go`, `cmd/mavend/voicewire.go`.
- Deploy: `token_file` in `deploy/mavgpud.json`, `MAVEN_GPU_TOKEN` in
  `deploy/telegram.env.example`.
- Commits: `95e7427`, `1c13d22`, `5596cdd`, `9bb3425`.

**Deploy step, not yet done:** write the token to
`/home/kami/.config/mavgpud.token` on workpc and put the same value in
`MAVEN_GPU_TOKEN` on homesrv, before restarting either side. mavgpud refuses to
start without it, and a homesrv missing it falls back to the resident model.

### Passkey credential persistence is not crash-atomic

**A — Location:** `cmd/mavweb/credentials.go:36` serializes the full credential map and overwrites the live file directly with `os.WriteFile` at line 41.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A crash, disk-full event or interrupted write can corrupt every enrolled credential and prevent mavweb from starting.

**C — Proposed fix:** Write a `0600` temporary file in the same directory, `fsync`, rename atomically, then sync the directory. Preserve the last known-good file and test simulated write failures.

No new tracked hardcoded keys, raw user-concatenated SQL, `eval`, or shell execution of untrusted strings were found. The historical DB-key exposure is already covered by V-12.

## 6. Circular dependencies and layering

### Domain packages depend directly on storage/wire DTOs

**A — Location:** Dialogue imports `store` and exposes `store.DialogueSessionRow` in its port at `internal/dialogue/session.go:9` and line 75. The pure morning planner accepts `store.Fact` at `internal/morning/plan.go:72`. Auth policy imports IPC method and caller types at `internal/auth/policy.go:8` and `internal/auth/scope.go:33`.

**B — Severity:** Low. There is no current Go import cycle, but domain changes are coupled to database and IPC schema changes.

**C — Proposed fix:** Make domain packages own their DTOs and ports—dialogue persistence records, morning evidence, auth operation/caller identity—and adapt them in store/IPC/cmd wiring.

No circular Go imports were found; compilation and `go vet` both succeeded.

## 7. Dead code and zombie endpoints

### Eleven production symbols are unreachable

**A — Location:** `deadcode` found:

- `cmd/mavwaked/vad.go:244` — `PCMToF32`
- `cmd/mavwaked/vad.go:265` — `AudioDuration`
- `internal/crawl/watch.go:86` — `Watcher.Watches`
- `internal/phraser/confirm.go:137` — `IsC`
- `internal/phraser/plural.go:13` — `CountWord`
- `internal/phraser/eval/checks.go:80` — `HisGender`
- `internal/update/update.go:363` — `WithClock`
- `internal/voice/errors.go:72` — `jsonMarshal`
- `internal/voice/errors.go:73` — `jsonUnmarshal`
- `internal/webauthn/cbor.go:98` — `cborValue.At`
- `internal/worker/server.go:64` — `Server.SetSynthesizer`

Three of the eleven do not want deleting, and the 2026-08-11 pass checked each:

- `internal/phraser/eval/checks.go:80` `HisGender` is deliberately exposed and deliberately uncalled. The comment at line 72 ties the trio to V-399, and `cmd/mavend/personaguard.go:94` states why this one is not run on a phrased message. Deleting it removes a documented seam.
- `cmd/mavwaked/vad.go:265` `AudioDuration` duplicates what `internal/audio` already computes. Call that instead of deleting the body.
- `internal/phraser/plural.go:13` `CountWord` is a one-line alias for `say.CountWord`, and every real caller already uses `say` directly. Safe to delete outright.

**B — Severity:** Low. They increase API and test surface, and some comments claim callers that no longer exist.

**C — Proposed fix:** Delete the genuinely obsolete symbols. Where one is an intended extension seam, add the actual caller and a contract test, or record why it stays. Add `deadcode ./...` with an explicit allowlist to the audit gate, since an unannotated list invites deleting the three above.

The repository history begins on 2026-07-03, so a six-month rotten-feature-flag check is not yet applicable. One zombie HTTP route does exist: `/ws` is wired at `cmd/mavweb/main.go:235` and no shipped client reaches it, since the browser posts to `/api/ptt`. Section 8 carries the detail.

## 8. Performance hot paths and memory/resource leaks

### Digest dedupe happens after paying the LLM cost

**A — Location:** `cmd/mavend/tick_digest.go:147` calls `PhraseNudge` before `EnqueueDigestEntry` reports the dedupe at line 153. The `else if deduped { continue }` is the last statement in the loop body, so it changes nothing.

**B — Severity:** Medium. Every tick that continues suppressing the same rule can invoke the model again, contrary to the cache claim in the preceding comment.

**C — Proposed fix:** Check for a live pending entry by stable rule/candidate fingerprint before phrasing, or persist/cache the phrased result with a TTL. Add a test asserting one phraser call across repeated suppressed ticks.

### PTT reads an unbounded body and neither server sets header or idle limits

**A — Location:** `handlePTT` performs an unlimited `io.ReadAll` at `cmd/mavweb/voiceproxy.go:125`. Mavweb and mavgpud construct servers without header or idle limits at `cmd/mavweb/main.go:242` and `cmd/mavgpud/main.go:148`. Separately, `handleWS` never calls `conn.SetReadLimit`, so the dependency default of 32,768 bytes applies at `vendor/github.com/coder/websocket/read.go:92`, about one second of 16kHz mono PCM.

**B — Severity:** Medium for the HTTP side. A client can force unbounded body allocation or hold a connection open indefinitely. Low for the WebSocket read limit, because `/ws` has no caller: the browser client posts PCM to `/api/ptt` at `cmd/mavweb/static/app.js:114`, and `/ws` is wired at `cmd/mavweb/main.go:235` but reached only from `handlers_test.go`. The 64MiB `maxFrame` at `cmd/mavweb/voiceproxy.go:27` is not an unapplied declaration. It caps the mavend voice wire at line 194 and line 212, which is the "either direction" its comment names.

**C — Proposed fix:** Use `http.MaxBytesReader` for PTT and return 413 on overflow. Configure `ReadHeaderTimeout`, `IdleTimeout` and header limits on both servers. Decide `/ws` separately: either give it an audio-duration read limit and a client, or delete it. See section 7.

## 9. Error propagation and user feedback

### Mavweb has no consistent, traceable error contract

**A — Location:** Some handlers expose raw internal errors, such as `cmd/mavweb/tools.go:57`, `cmd/mavweb/routines.go:58` and `cmd/mavweb/webauthn.go:122`. Others return generic errors without a request/incident identifier, such as `cmd/mavweb/facts.go:90`. No HTTP request-ID middleware was found.

**B — Severity:** Medium. Raw errors can disclose implementation details, while generic errors cannot be correlated with the correct log entry.

**C — Proposed fix:** Add a central `writeProblem`/error-page helper with a stable error code and generated request ID; log the full wrapped error server-side and return only a sanitized message plus the ID. Carry the ID into IPC/ecosystem correlation where possible.

## 10. Configuration drift and environment assumptions

### Committed absolute paths make builds and deployment host-specific

**A — Location:** `go.mod:31` replaces Hexis with `/home/kami/apps/hexis`. `start-maven.sh:11` hardcodes the Maven checkout and line 40 hardcodes the data directory. `deploy/mavgpud.json:12` and line 35 contain workstation-specific model/Python paths.

**B — Severity:** Medium. Vendoring masks the `go.mod` problem for ordinary builds, but `-mod=mod`, tidy and fresh non-Kami checkouts fail. Deployment files cannot be reused safely on another host.

**C — Proposed fix:** Pin a real Hexis module revision; keep local replacement in an uncommitted `go.work`. Derive script root from the script location and make data paths configurable. Split mavgpud into a committed template plus host-local override.

### Environment examples do not cover deployed variables

**A — Location:** Active config references `MAVEN_STT_TOKEN` at `deploy/mavend.json:101`, Compose references `MAVEN_AMBIENT_TOKEN` at `docker-compose.yml:109`, and the GPU service expects `CW2_TOKEN` at `deploy/mavgpud.service:15`. `deploy/telegram.env.example:5` documents only Telegram and ntfy. The loader deliberately converts missing variables to empty settings at `internal/config/config.go:333`.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A fresh deployment can lose remote STT or ambient authentication and run on fallback behavior despite apparently valid config. It is not silent: `internal/config/config.go:340` logs which variables were unset and states that whatever they configure is off. What is missing is a startup failure and an example file naming them.

**C — Proposed fix:** Maintain one canonical secret manifest/example covering every referenced variable, or service-specific examples with validation. Fail startup when an enabled integration lacks its required secret; permit empty variables only for explicitly disabled blocks.

No production/staging debug-mode or mock-gateway drift was found.

## 11. Declared invariants with no guard

`CLAUDE.md` names several rules as load-bearing. Two of them are enforced by
nothing, which the first pass missed because it audited generic categories only.

### `heads_path` may equal `model_path` and nothing objects

**A — Location:** `cmd/mavend/voicewire.go:168` reads `cfg.Voice.Embedder.HeadsPath` and loads it without comparing it to the model path. The rule is stated at `internal/config/voice.go:41`, which says the heads graph is a fine-tuned COPY, and again in `CLAUDE.md`.

**B — Severity:** Medium. Pointing both keys at the same file degrades recall, because the routing heads then score with the same graph the resident e5-small uses. There is no error and no log line, so the failure looks like ordinary recall drift.

**C — Proposed fix:** Reject the config at load when `heads_path` equals `model_path` after path cleaning. A daemon that cannot route well should refuse to start rather than answer worse.

### `baselineGrammars` mirrors `buildRouter` by hand

**A — Location:** `internal/router/eval/eval_test.go:263` restates the stage 0 rule set in the daemon's order, and its own comment says so. `claims_test.go:30`, `heads_test.go:76` and `eval_test.go:221` all score against it. Nothing compares the two lists.

**B — Severity:** Medium. A grammar added to `buildRouter` and not to the fixture means every routing measurement scores a set nobody runs, which is the failure mode `CLAUDE.md` warns about by name.

**C — Proposed fix:** Export the grammar set from one place and have both `buildRouter` and the fixture consume it, or add a test that diffs the two by grammar name and fails on drift.

`tokenizerRev` and `preRouteLadder` were checked and need nothing.
`internal/router/onnxembedder.go:91` bakes the rev into the embedder key, so a
bump changes the key and triggers re-embedding. `cmd/mavend/voice.go:278` passes
`preRouteLadder` to `decision.Expect`, so a missing rung is observable.

## Cross-cutting subsystem candidates

The recurring findings suggest five reusable patterns:

- A bounded, required-field-validating JSON client for STT, weather, ecosystem and model calls.
- Authenticated remote-service middleware providing token checks, body limits, concurrency limits and correlation IDs.
- Atomic state-transition helpers using conditional SQL and `RowsAffected`.
- A uniform HTTP problem/error envelope.
- A repository health gate combining `staticcheck`, `govulncheck`, `deadcode` and dependency audits.

## Validation

- `make fmt-check` and `make vet` passed. `make audit` passed too, but it is a git-grep inventory over loc, todo, stubs, docs, tests and gaps (`scripts/audit.sh`), not a static-analysis gate. Do not read it as one.
- `staticcheck`, `govulncheck`, `deadcode`, tracked-secret and history scans and npm audit were run out of tree. None of the three Go analyzers is installed on this box or wired into any make target, which is the argument for section 4's proposed gate.
- The advisory version numbers in section 4 could not be re-checked offline on 2026-08-11. `deps/go/go/VERSION` reads `go1.25.5`, built 2025-11-26, so the eight-month gap behind current supports the upgrade claim.
- The first whole-tree race run failed once in `cmd/mavend` while analyzers were compiling concurrently; a fresh isolated `go test -race -count=1 ./cmd/mavend` passed in 100.6 seconds, so the transient result was not counted as a defect.
- The pre-existing `deploy/mavwaked.service` modification and untracked `deploy/asoundrc` remained untouched.
