Expose discovered MCP tools through the act allowlist (#251)
Second half of the MCP client: the tools the manager discovers become rows in the existing act allowlist instead of a parallel capability system. An MCP tool is encoded in the columns that already exist — cmd ["mcp",<server>,<tool>], scope mcp:<server> — so no migration, and ProposeTool/EnableTool/DisableTool, tool.Matcher and the confirm turn need no changes. One branch in Executor.Exec routes such a row to the manager instead of exec, and "mcp" is never run as a binary. Discovery only ever PROPOSES. destructive comes from the inverse of the MCP readOnlyHint, so a tool that does not promise to be read-only inherits the confirm turn, and enabling stays on /tools behind step-up. Voice args are positional and MCP args are named, so CallPositional binds only what it can defend: no required properties runs bare, and a read-only tool with exactly one required string or number gets the tail. Everything else refuses with ErrNeedsArgs rather than guessing. The read-only condition was learned against the live Vikunja server: update_task requires only task_id and takes the rest as optional, so one guessed argument blanked the fields it did not mention. A partially-filled write destroys what it omits, so a mutating tool never receives a guessed argument. Also: a read-only mcp_servers IPC method and an "MCP servers" card on /tools showing transport, target and state, with the trust level of a local target spelled out. There is deliberately no call-a-tool IPC method and no run button, so mutation keeps exactly one path. Vikunja #251
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@@ -319,6 +319,19 @@ type Tool struct {
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Updated time.Time `json:"updated"`
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}
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// MCPServerStatus — one configured MCP server, as the web surface sees it.
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// Target is the command or url; Tools is how many tools discovery kept after
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// allow_tools / max_tools, not how many the server offers.
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type MCPServerStatus struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Transport string `json:"transport"` // "stdio" (a local subprocess) or "http"
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Target string `json:"target"`
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Connected bool `json:"connected"`
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Server string `json:"server,omitempty"` // the server's own name + version
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Tools int `json:"tools"`
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Err string `json:"err,omitempty"`
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}
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// chatReq / chatResp — text chat round-trip for the IPC Chat method.
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type chatReq struct {
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Text string `json:"text"`
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@@ -457,6 +470,14 @@ type CoreAPI interface {
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// TickTrace.
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MorningStatus(ctx context.Context) ([]MorningRoutineStatus, error)
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// MCPServers reports the configured MCP servers and their health
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// (Vikunja #251). Read-only introspection for /tools — there is no
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// "call this tool" method on purpose: an MCP tool runs through the same
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// allowlist, confirm turn and act path as any other tool, and a second
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// mutation path would be a second thing to get wrong. Empty when the
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// mcp config block is absent, which is the default.
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MCPServers(ctx context.Context) ([]MCPServerStatus, error)
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// DayPlan returns today's ordered plan — calendar events, pending
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// reminders and any morning checklist still outstanding (see
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// internal/morning.BuildPlan) — plus the spoken RU rendering of it.
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