Swap the resident model without restarting mavend (#250)

Loading a different gguf was a one-line edit to phraser.model_path plus a
restart. It is now an owner-triggered IPC call, off unless configured.

internal/phraser/swap.go holds the safety properties as code:

  - Never two models resident. The old llama-server is killed and reaped
    before the new one is launched. One 1.7B fits the Vega iGPU; a
    blue/green overlap would OOM the box, so it is not offered.
  - Atomic from a turn's point of view. Swap drains the in-flight turns
    (they finish on the old model), then refuses arrivals with ErrSwapping
    until the new server has answered /v1/models. No turn ever sees half a
    swap; refused turns fall back to the classifier cascade.
  - A failed load rolls back. If the new model does not start or does not
    probe, the previous one is reloaded and the call returns RolledBack
    with the error. If the rollback also fails the daemon says so and
    degrades to the classifier rather than pretending to serve.

Holders of the completion client are re-pointed, not rebuilt: llm.Client
guards its base URL and LLMPhraser.OnSwap re-points it, so the router, the
replier, the mail extractor and the memory evaluator follow the new port
without knowing a swap happened.

Reach is deliberately narrow. phraser.swap_models is an exact-match
allowlist of absolute paths a human wrote, rejected at startup otherwise,
so "swap the model" can never mean "load any file on my disk"; the running
model is always swappable back to. MethodSwapModel is AuthStepUp, the same
rung as mutating the tool allowlist, and /models gates POST through the
same stepUpOK the tools page uses. Nothing calls Swap on a timer and no
act, intent or utterance reaches it.

Vikunja #250

internal/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -393,3 +393,26 @@ func mustWriteFactParams(source string) []byte {
 	}
 	return b
 }
+
+// TestRequirement_SwapModel — loading a different resident model is an owner
+// action at the same rung as mutating the tool allowlist: it decides how every
+// utterance is routed and how every reply is worded. The read side is not.
+func TestRequirement_SwapModel(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := Requirement(ipc.MethodSwapModel); got != AuthStepUp {
+		t.Errorf("SwapModel authority = %v; want AuthStepUp", got)
+	}
+	if got := Requirement(ipc.MethodModelStatus); got != AuthRead {
+		t.Errorf("ModelStatus authority = %v; want AuthRead", got)
+	}
+	// A surface that cannot carry a passkey gesture cannot swap the model, no
+	// matter what it is enrolled as — this is the "never through voice" property.
+	voice := Scope{Surface: SurfaceVoice, Module: "voice", SourceScope: []string{"*"}}
+	if err := Can(ipc.MethodSwapModel, voice, nil); !errors.Is(err, ErrForbidden) {
+		t.Errorf("voice swapping the model = %v; want ErrForbidden", err)
+	}
+	// And with no step-up session asserted, the gate refuses even a capable surface.
+	noSession := &Gate{Enrollment: NewFloorEnrollment()}
+	if err := noSession.Check(context.Background(), ipc.MethodSwapModel, nil); !errors.Is(err, ipc.ErrForbidden) {
+		t.Errorf("SwapModel with no asserted step-up = %v; want ErrForbidden", err)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/policy.go

@@ -53,6 +53,13 @@ func Requirement(m ipc.Method) Authority {
 		// asserted — never a module or the voice/chat path. maven can propose
 		// (MethodProposeTool, no step-up: she has no passkey) but never en/disable.
 		return AuthStepUp
+	case ipc.MethodSwapModel:
+		// Swapping the resident model changes what routes every utterance and
+		// what words every reply. It is the owner's call, from a surface that can
+		// carry a passkey gesture — the same rung as mutating the tool allowlist,
+		// and for the same reason: nothing Maven says or does may reach it.
+		// MethodModelStatus is only the read side, so it stays at AuthRead.
+		return AuthStepUp
 	case ipc.MethodWriteFact:
 		return AuthWrite
 	case ipc.MethodAssertStepUp:
@@ -79,7 +86,10 @@ func Requirement(m ipc.Method) Authority {
 		// produce: candidate tasks and nothing else. It cannot write a fact, set a
 		// reminder, or touch the tool allowlist, so a compromised mail reader can
 		// at worst put junk on a review page he clears in one click.
-		ipc.MethodIngestMail:
+		ipc.MethodIngestMail,
+		// The read side of the model swap: which model is resident, which ones are
+		// allowlisted. It loads nothing and changes nothing.
+		ipc.MethodModelStatus:
 		return AuthRead
 	}
 	// Unknown method ⇒ AuthRead, but ipc.dispatch returns ErrUnknownMethod