Merge branch 'fix/g09' into fix/integrated

internal/ipc/api.go

@@ -362,6 +362,12 @@ type Speaker struct {
 	Name     string    `json:"name"`
 	Enrolled time.Time `json:"enrolled"`
 	Samples  int       `json:"samples"`
+	// Damaged — the stored row's metadata did not read back cleanly. The
+	// voiceprint is still there; the name, sample count or enrolment time is
+	// not trustworthy. A surface should say so rather than render a corrupt
+	// row as a profile enrolled from zero samples, which is what a real
+	// minimal enrolment looks like.
+	Damaged bool `json:"damaged,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // EnrollSpeakerResp — the profile that was written.
@@ -804,14 +810,22 @@ type DayPlan struct {
 }
 
 // storeEncryptionKeyReq — the passkey-derived secret used to wrap the store
-// encryption key at enrollment time. Called by mavweb after RegisterFinish.
+// encryption key. Called by mavweb after a verified assertion.
 //
 // Secret is the 32-byte WebAuthn PRF output, NOT the credential public key.
 // The field used to carry the public key and that was the bug: a public key
 // sits in passkeys.json next to the wrapped blob, so the blob protected
 // nothing. See internal/webauthn/keywrap.go.
+//
+// Explicit says the operator asked for the cold-start key to be written, as
+// opposed to it being a side effect of asserting a passkey. Without the flag
+// the daemon writes only when no blob exists yet. Rewriting on every assertion
+// is what let a page-level compromise substitute its own PRF value and have
+// the daemon re-wrap the real database key under it, and what let a second
+// authenticator silently replace the first one's blob.
 type storeEncryptionKeyReq struct {
-	Secret []byte `json:"secret"`
+	Secret   []byte `json:"secret"`
+	Explicit bool   `json:"explicit,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // unlockReq — the passkey-derived secret for unwrapping the store encryption