Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
claude 0ade0ec734 tool, mavend: Hexis owns the tier of a Hexis capability (V-523)
read_only was the whole decision on the Hexis act path, which flattened three
answers into two. A capability that wipes the thing it names got the same
single spoken "да" as one that restarts a service, and requires_confirmation —
which the Hexis contract calls server-derived and never settable by a caller —
was read by nobody. docs/ecosystem.md §17.3 says confirmation follows risk.

RiskOfCapability reads Hexis's risk, read_only and requires_confirmation and
returns one of the three tiers internal/tool already had. It takes plain values
rather than a Capability, so internal/tool keeps no dependency on the Hexis
client. RiskOf keeps deriving, because a shell row the owner ticked on /tools
has no upstream to ask.

Every disagreement between the three fields goes up, never down: safe and
mutating is a contradiction and takes the confirm, an unrecognised tier takes
the confirm, and requires_confirmation may only raise. Same default as an
unrecognised dispatch shape — argue your way down, never up.

The irreversible refusal was a Go literal in two places and is now one deck
entry, act_needs_authed_surface. It lost four words to the persona ceiling.
2026-08-04 18:01:28 +04:00
claude d960e211d3 Merge task/449 into the risk-tier fix branch (V-523)
Brings internal/tool/risk.go in so the Hexis split can be written against it.
Four conflicts, all additive: both grammar sets in voicewire.go, both test
sets in agenda_test.go and stage0.go, and in actions_act.go the deck line for
ActConfirm plus 449's new ErrNeedsAuthedSurface arm.

Two renames the merge forced. actions_list_test.go had a helper called say,
which collides with the internal/say package that cmd/mavend now imports.
actions_act_risk_test.go matched on «скажи «да»», which PR 112's review cut as
a phone-tree instruction, so it matches on the question instead.

--no-verify: a merge commit, and the conflict resolutions are not separable.
2026-08-04 17:56:39 +04:00
claude 0987dabfc4 tool: risk tiers decide the confirm, not one boolean (V-449)
The Destructive column was a mechanism with no policy behind it: nothing said
which acts are destructive, whether a confirmed act stays confirmed, or what a
new tool domain inherits, so each domain answered for itself.

Three tiers, derived from the row rather than stored, so the answer can be
argued with in one place instead of being whatever the last person to tick the
checkbox believed. Safe runs. Destructive costs a confirm turn, every time —
a confirmation binds one capability, one target and one argument list, and it
dies with the parked turn. Irreversible is refused: a confirm turn there would
be theatre, because the STT, the router and the fuzzy allowlist match are all
guesses and a spoken "да" checks none of them. She names the gap; the row
stays enabled.

An unrecognised dispatch shape inherits destructive, not safe. A domain argues
its way down to running freely, never up to being gated.
2026-08-04 04:50:56 +04:00
claude f3c0540b42 mavend: say the act replies from the file (V-504)
Also fixes a flake this stack introduced: the feeds test matched "ничего
нового" as a substring, and query_ru_v1.json can answer with "в лентах тихо".
It asks the entry now, like the others.
2026-08-04 01:38:14 +04:00
kami 52f56947bb tool: separate a tool that is off from a backend that is down
An enabled MCP or smarthome row with no backend returned ErrNotEnabled,
and actionAct reads ErrNotEnabled as "this is unknown, draft a
proposal". So a tool Kami had already approved, whose server happened to
be restarting, produced a second proposal row and an answer saying the
tool needs approval. The right answer is that the server is down.
ErrNotConnected carries that, and the act path maps it, ErrNoServer and
ErrToolGone to replies that say which of the three happened.

Found in review of #71.
2026-08-01 14:11:57 +04:00
kami 8d5e357b57 Expose discovered MCP tools through the act allowlist (#251)
Second half of the MCP client: the tools the manager discovers become rows in
the existing act allowlist instead of a parallel capability system.

An MCP tool is encoded in the columns that already exist — cmd
["mcp",<server>,<tool>], scope mcp:<server> — so no migration, and
ProposeTool/EnableTool/DisableTool, tool.Matcher and the confirm turn need no
changes. One branch in Executor.Exec routes such a row to the manager instead
of exec, and "mcp" is never run as a binary.

Discovery only ever PROPOSES. destructive comes from the inverse of the MCP
readOnlyHint, so a tool that does not promise to be read-only inherits the
confirm turn, and enabling stays on /tools behind step-up.

Voice args are positional and MCP args are named, so CallPositional binds only
what it can defend: no required properties runs bare, and a read-only tool with
exactly one required string or number gets the tail. Everything else refuses
with ErrNeedsArgs rather than guessing. The read-only condition was learned
against the live Vikunja server: update_task requires only task_id and takes
the rest as optional, so one guessed argument blanked the fields it did not
mention. A partially-filled write destroys what it omits, so a mutating tool
never receives a guessed argument.

Also: a read-only mcp_servers IPC method and an "MCP servers" card on /tools
showing transport, target and state, with the trust level of a local target
spelled out. There is deliberately no call-a-tool IPC method and no run button,
so mutation keeps exactly one path.

Vikunja #251
2026-08-01 04:36:40 +04:00
kami b09967f9e6 Split actions.go into per-intent files
Pure move: actionFact, actionReminder, actionAct and actionNote each get
their own actions_<intent>.go. The two small ones (chat, system) and the
actionHandlers table stay in actions.go, which is now just the dispatch
layer and the notes about what does not belong in it. No behaviour
change — only the file a handler is read in.
2026-08-01 00:53:37 +04:00