Loading a different gguf was a one-line edit to phraser.model_path plus a
restart. It is now an owner-triggered IPC call, off unless configured.
internal/phraser/swap.go holds the safety properties as code:
- Never two models resident. The old llama-server is killed and reaped
before the new one is launched. One 1.7B fits the Vega iGPU; a
blue/green overlap would OOM the box, so it is not offered.
- Atomic from a turn's point of view. Swap drains the in-flight turns
(they finish on the old model), then refuses arrivals with ErrSwapping
until the new server has answered /v1/models. No turn ever sees half a
swap; refused turns fall back to the classifier cascade.
- A failed load rolls back. If the new model does not start or does not
probe, the previous one is reloaded and the call returns RolledBack
with the error. If the rollback also fails the daemon says so and
degrades to the classifier rather than pretending to serve.
Holders of the completion client are re-pointed, not rebuilt: llm.Client
guards its base URL and LLMPhraser.OnSwap re-points it, so the router, the
replier, the mail extractor and the memory evaluator follow the new port
without knowing a swap happened.
Reach is deliberately narrow. phraser.swap_models is an exact-match
allowlist of absolute paths a human wrote, rejected at startup otherwise,
so "swap the model" can never mean "load any file on my disk"; the running
model is always swappable back to. MethodSwapModel is AuthStepUp, the same
rung as mutating the tool allowlist, and /models gates POST through the
same stepUpOK the tools page uses. Nothing calls Swap on a timer and no
act, intent or utterance reaches it.
Vikunja #250
The network fallback behind the local sources, off unless configured.
internal/crawl is pure: a stdlib robots.txt parser (group specificity,
wildcards, Crawl-delay, cached per host), HTML-to-plaintext extraction, and a
watcher that notes a watched page only when its text changed. It has no store
access and no net/http; cmd/mavend/crawls.go is the impure half.
Every limit is code and tested: the guarded fetcher from #258 enforces the host
allowlist/denylist, refuses private addresses in the dialer Control hook (so DNS
rebinding and each redirect hop are covered), caps size and redirects, times out,
and spaces requests per host. A robots.txt Disallow is refused with no override.
On demand, reading is a query source placed last in the chain, after his memory,
his notes, and the local Kiwix ZIMs once those are wired: no URL in the
utterance means no fetch, and only the URL ever leaves the box. Scheduled
watches write notes and announce nothing.
The vendored tree has no x/net/html, goquery or temoto/robotstxt, so the parsers
are stdlib. No new dependency.
internal/rss parses RSS 2.0 and Atom, and polls each configured feed on its own
interval; internal/webfetch is the one door either of them uses to touch the
network. The poller writes items as notes with source "rss:<feed>" and nothing
else: the answer path reads them back when he asks "что нового в лентах?", and
nothing is announced on arrival. A feed that dispatched would be a nag, which is
why the plan's breaking-news rule was left out rather than built.
webfetch is where the limits live, as code rather than a paragraph: http(s)
only, an allowlist (the configured feeds' hosts) and a denylist, a 2 MiB body
cap, a 3-redirect cap, one request per host per second, and a refusal to connect
to any private address — checked in the dialer's Control hook so it holds for
every resolved address and every redirect hop, not just for a literal IP.
Off unless configured: no "feeds" block, no poller, no outbound request. How far
a feed was read is a config fact (rss:latest:<name>), so a restart does not
re-note yesterday's headlines.
kami