Files
kami 95ae900a58 Talk MCP: a client for external tool servers (#251)
docs/plans/06-mcp-support.md asks for the host direction — Maven connects OUT
to MCP servers and consumes what they offer. This is the client half: the
protocol, the transports, the connection manager, the config block. Nothing is
wired into a turn yet, and nothing here exposes Maven's own capabilities to an
outside caller.

internal/mcp:
  - hand-rolled JSON-RPC 2.0 (the wire format is four fields, and the repo
    vendors its deps, so a library would cost more than it saves);
  - two transports: a stdio subprocess on this box, and streamable HTTP, which
    accepts a plain JSON reply or an SSE frame because servers disagree about
    which they send;
  - Client: initialize handshake, tools/list, tools/call, resources/list,
    resources/read. Text content only — everything downstream is a sentence;
  - Manager: lazy dial, per-server failure that never blocks boot or the other
    servers, backoff reconnect, Status for a web surface, graceful Close;
  - the allowlist encoding: a discovered tool becomes the store row
    "vikunja_list_tasks" with cmd ["mcp","vikunja","list_tasks"], scope
    "mcp:vikunja". No new column, no migration, and ProposeTool, EnableTool,
    the act matcher and the confirm turn all keep working untouched.

Constraints held, in code rather than in prose:
  - OFF unless configured, and a server is dark until "enabled": true.
  - A url server goes through internal/webfetch, so the SSRF guard, the size
    cap, the redirect cap and the per-host rate limit apply. Reaching loopback
    needs allow_private on THAT server, and each server gets its own fetcher so
    one loopback exemption cannot become a hole for a public endpoint.
  - readOnlyHint decides destructive: no hint means "assume it mutates", which
    will route the call through the existing confirm turn. Guessing wrong in
    that direction only costs a question.
  - The catalogue stays small on purpose — allow_tools, and max_tools=12 per
    server. The resident model is a 1.7B with a 4096-token context; a tool name
    it half-remembers is a wrong act.
  - Only the tool name and the router's arguments are sent. There is no API
    here through which a note, a fact or the persona block could travel.

webfetch grows Post (JSON-RPC cannot be a GET) and surfaces response headers
for Mcp-Session-Id. It shares Get's guards exactly: a body buys a caller
nothing, a POST to the LAN is refused for the same reason a GET is.

Verified against the real Vikunja MCP server on homesrv
(http://localhost:9100/mcp): handshake, three discovered tools with update_task
correctly NOT read-only, a live list_projects call, a tool excluded by
allow_tools refused, and the same server refused outright once allow_private
was dropped. Tests cover both transports (the stdio one against a real
subprocess), SSE and JSON framing, session echo, reconnect, and the config
validation.
2026-08-01 04:22:52 +04:00

73 lines
3.1 KiB
Go

// Package mcp is Maven's Model Context Protocol CLIENT. She is a host: she
// connects OUT to MCP servers, discovers the tools and resources they offer,
// and hands them to the parts of her that already exist for this — the tool
// allowlist in the store, the confirm turn for anything that mutates, the
// stage-3 gate that makes an uncertain act ask instead of run.
//
// She is not an MCP server. Nothing here exposes her own capabilities to an
// outside caller; docs/plans/06-mcp-support.md asks for the host direction only.
//
// Boundaries, in code rather than in prose:
//
// - OFF unless configured. No mcp_servers block ⇒ no manager, no goroutine,
// no socket.
// - A remote server is reached through internal/webfetch, so the SSRF guard,
// the size cap, the redirect cap and the per-host rate limit all apply to
// an MCP endpoint exactly as they do to a news feed. Reaching a loopback
// or LAN server means explicitly setting allow_private on THAT server —
// a different trust level, spelled out per server rather than globally.
// - Only the tool name and the arguments the router produced are sent. This
// package never sees his notes, facts, history or the persona block, and
// has no API through which a caller could pass them.
// - Discovery proposes, it does not enable. A discovered tool lands as a
// 'proposed' row; a human enables it on the authed surface.
package mcp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
)
// ProtocolVersion — the spec revision we ask for in the initialize handshake.
// A server that answers with a different one is accepted (the spec says the
// client may proceed if it can support what came back); we only refuse when it
// answers with no version at all, which means it is not an MCP server.
const ProtocolVersion = "2025-06-18"
// rpcRequest / rpcResponse — JSON-RPC 2.0. Deliberately hand-rolled: the wire
// format is four fields, and the repo vendors its dependencies, so pulling a
// library in for this would cost more than it saves.
type rpcRequest struct {
JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
ID int64 `json:"id,omitempty"`
Method string `json:"method"`
Params any `json:"params,omitempty"`
}
type rpcResponse struct {
JSONRPC string `json:"jsonrpc"`
ID *int64 `json:"id"`
Result json.RawMessage `json:"result,omitempty"`
Error *rpcError `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
type rpcError struct {
Code int `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
func (e *rpcError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("mcp: rpc error %d: %s", e.Code, e.Message) }
// transport carries one JSON-RPC conversation. Implementations: stdioTransport
// (a subprocess on this box) and httpTransport (streamable HTTP, guarded by
// webfetch). Both must be safe for concurrent use by the Client.
type transport interface {
// Call sends a request and returns the matching response.
Call(ctx context.Context, req *rpcRequest) (*rpcResponse, error)
// Notify sends a notification (no id, no reply expected).
Notify(ctx context.Context, method string, params any) error
// Close releases the transport (kills the subprocess, drops the session).
Close() error
}