Maven/docs/architecture

docs/architecture

An observation of Maven as built, read at 5cae33a on 2026-08-25. It describes what the code does today. It proposes nothing.

This directory is a build output plus its sources. index.html, maven-architecture.json, anchors.md and diagrams/*.svg are generated.

Read it

file	what it is
index.html	the viewer. Open it from the filesystem, no server needed. Seven views, the rendered diagram above each, click a component for its record.
check_viewer.js	the viewer's only check. Runs every view against a DOM stub, because a TypeError in a renderer shows as a blank panel and not as an error.
findings.md	the analysis. Kept apart from the facts on purpose.
maven-architecture.json	the inventory. 160 components, 204 relations. The factual source for everything else.
anchors.md	every symbol the inventory names, resolved to path:line with the line quoted.
diagrams/*.mmd	the five views as Mermaid source. 03a, 03b and 03c are the three traced requests.
diagrams/*.svg	the same, rendered.

Rebuild it

python3 docs/architecture/build_inventory.py   # → maven-architecture.json
python3 docs/architecture/verify_anchors.py    # → anchors.md, exit 1 if stale
sh      docs/architecture/render.sh            # → diagrams/*.svg, then index.html, then check_viewer.js
python3 docs/architecture/build_viewer.py      # → index.html alone
node    docs/architecture/check_viewer.js     # → every view rendered, no throw

Views 6 and 7 read docs/capabilities/, not this directory. View 6 is the capability matrix, 51 rows against seven dimensions. View 7 is the twelve cross-cutting invariants and the components that participate in each. Both are inlined by build_viewer.py, which reads ledger.yaml and invariants.yaml rather than deriving anything itself: the ledger's build is the only thing allowed to decide a dimension.

render.sh drives mermaid-cli through the system chromium rather than letting puppeteer download its own. It is also the only syntax check this repo has for a .mmd.

What is verified, and what is not

Verified mechanically. verify_anchors.py resolves all 692 claimed symbols against the files their component names. Current state: 681 resolved to a line and 0 unresolved, with 0 missing files. The other 11 are config keys and make targets rather than Go identifiers, so they are skipped. The script exits non-zero on any failure, which makes it a staleness gate.

Writing it caught 29 symbols filed under the wrong component and seven names that were wrong outright. Two examples: Store.RecordEvent for what is really Store.CreateEvent, and media.Keeper for what is really media.Store.

Not verified. That a symbol means what its responsibility says. An anchor proves the identifier is on that line and nothing more. Judgements about ownership, coupling and enforcement are readings of the code. A reading can be wrong in a way grep cannot catch.

Marked, not resolved. Relations carry a confidence field. medium means the wiring is in the source and the call path was not traced end to end. low means it was inferred from one reference. The viewer can hide both. Four relations are medium and one is low.

Deployment-specific. Sixteen components are configured-off against deploy/mavend.json as it stood on the day, and that file was dirty in the working tree. A different config makes different components live. status says which, per component.

The one thing to check first

findings.md 6.3 through 6.3d. They say the system has no single point that decides whether an origin may cause an effect, and that the pieces which look like that point are each answering a different question.

Revised on 2026-08-25 after an independent second pass. Four readings changed and one earlier statement was wrong. Section 6.3 marks the corrections.

Start at internal/tool/tool.go:181, cmd/mavend/ecosystem_acts.go:158 and internal/router/claim.go:38.

The evidence pack

sh docs/architecture/pack_evidence.sh builds maven-evidence.zip at the repo root: this directory, the structural context, and whole source files for the architectural seams. Whole files, never snippets, because a cut-down file loses the call path that makes a claim checkable.

The path list is an allowlist, not an exclusion list. A denylist ships whatever nobody thought to exclude, and this tree has a database key in it.

architecture-evidence.txt is the reviewer's index. It resolves a named symbol list against the checkout and says plainly when a requested name does not exist. It also re-runs the probe under every contradiction, so a claim and its grep cannot drift apart.

One file is not verbatim. docker-compose.yml carries an uptime-kuma API key, so a redacted copy ships in its place with that one value replaced. The script diffs the two and aborts if anything else changed.

The scan at the end refuses to build on a credential-shaped hit rather than printing a warning. Both of its first two versions were wrong in instructive ways. The name filter deleted internal/router/singletoken.go for matching *token*. The value scan flagged docker volume lines that name where a secret would live and contain none.

The authorization function as implemented

The reconstruction, at the one decision point that gates an act (internal/tool/tool.go:156):

permit(tool, confirmed) =
      row.status == "enabled"                          tool.go:164
  AND tier != irreversible                             risk.go:74  VoiceMayRun:false
  AND (tier == safe OR confirmed)                      risk.go:72,76

tier is RiskOf(row). The reach is not an input: Executor.Exec takes (ctx, name, args, confirmed) and no surface.

confirmed is unproven at this boundary too. The invariant that a confirmation binds one capability, one target and an expiry lives in pendingAct and resolveConfirm. Exec trusts the boolean.

The expression covers two of the three act paths. Hexis reuses it deliberately (cmd/mavend/ecosystem_acts.go:768). The Praxis lifecycle path has no tier and no confirm turn: praxisItemAction.handle calls straight through at ecosystem_acts.go:158.

Behind the IPC boundary, auth.Can(method, scope, params) runs with scope.Surface always SurfaceCoreProcess (internal/auth/enrollment.go:65) and step-up held as one global timestamp that ignores Scope (internal/webauthn/session.go:38 and :62).

auth answers who may carry what authority. tool answers what effect a capability has and what proof it demands. Those are orthogonal, not competing. The decision combining them does not exist.

Two representations of reach exist and both are ignored. server.go:198 only defaults an empty p.Surface, so a client-asserted one survives and nothing reads it. server.go:148 hardcodes Session.Surface. Since req.Surface is request payload on an unauthenticated wire, it must not become an authorization input as it stands.