Scope creep — an implementer writing files it never declared — is the
dominant local-model failure that compiler/tests don't catch. A stage can
now declare a `writes` manifest (workspace-relative globs); a FILE_WRITE
that resolves inside the workspace but outside the declared set is raised
as PATH_OUTSIDE_MANIFEST → BLOCK, so the model gets the violation as tool
feedback and retries within scope (the §2 bounded-retry signal).
Implemented as a plane-2 rule beside PathContainmentRule (same effect-based
dispatch on FILE_WRITE, same symlink-safe WorldProbe resolution, same
recorded observations so replay reads them back — invariant #9). An empty
manifest is unrestricted; out-of-workspace targets stay PathContainmentRule's
concern, so the two rules don't double-flag.
- StageConfig.writeManifest + TomlWorkflowLoader `writes` parsing
- ToolCallAssessmentInput.writeManifest, threaded from the active stage via
SessionOrchestrator.runPlane2Assessment
- new ManifestContainmentRule, registered in the server assessor
- shared candidatePathStrings extracted so both path rules judge the same
target set
- role_pipeline.toml documents the option on the implementer stage
The dedicated ManifestViolationEvent the spec names is not added: the
violation is already recorded replayably in ToolCallAssessedEvent (issue +
observations + BLOCK) and surfaced in the TUI rationale band. A first-class
event is worth adding only once reconciliation consumes it.
Add ParamRole and a defaulted Tool.paramRoles to the tool contract; built-in
tools declare which params carry effects: file_read/write/edit -> path=PATH,
shell -> argv=EXEC_COMMAND. PathContainmentRule / ExecInterpreterRule /
NetworkHostRule now inspect only the declared params when roles are present, and
fall back to the looksLikePath / leading-token / extractHost heuristic only for
un-enriched (e.g. custom) tools - so a custom FILE_WRITE tool is still
containment-checked. Shared extractParamStrings flattens String and List<*>
(argv) values. SessionOrchestrator.runPlane2Assessment resolves the tool once
and passes tool.paramRoles into the assessment input.
This retires the arg-guessing from the first-party path: a slashy edit 'content'
arg is no longer mis-flagged as a path.
Implements the full vertical slice for invariant #9 tool-call assessment:
- core:toolintent — new module with ToolCallRule seam, ToolCallAssessor,
WorldProbe/FileSystemWorldProbe, WorkspacePolicy, PathContainmentRule,
and RiskMapping (assessment → RiskSummary / AssessedIssue)
- core:tools — ToolCallAssessmentRecord + ToolInvocationRecord.assessment
field; DefaultToolReducer handles ToolCallAssessedEvent (replay proof)
- core:config — ToolsConfig gains workspaceRoot + privilegedLocations;
ConfigLoader parses both; DEFAULT_PRIVILEGED_LOCATIONS built-in
- core:kernel — OrchestratorEngines gains toolCallAssessor/workspacePolicy/
worldProbe fields; SessionOrchestrator.dispatchToolCalls runs
runPlane2Assessment before the tier gate: BLOCK → hard-reject without
executing; PROMPT_USER → elevates tier into approval path with plane2Risk
in the ApprovalRequestedEvent
- apps/server — constructs PathContainmentRule + ToolCallAssessor +
WorkspacePolicy from config and wires them into OrchestratorEngines
Assessment is recorded as ToolCallAssessedEvent (environment observed once,
facts stored, replay reads events — invariant #9). Assessor and WorldProbe
are only invoked on the live orchestrator path, never in replay.