Three tool-path correctness fixes:
- Tool-execution events were emitted twice — SandboxedToolExecutor and
SessionOrchestrator.recordToolExecution both emitted Completed/Failed/
FileWritten per call (double TUI rows, double-counted metrics). Split
ownership: orchestrator is the sole recorder of Completed/Failed (truncates
output, drives the read-before-write gate); executor owns Started +
FileWritten (pre/post-image hashes it alone can capture).
- computeToolPreview still gated on operation == "write", but file_write lost
its operation param when delete was split out, so it bailed to raw-args for
every write (approval card showed raw JSON). Drop the dead guard.
- A file_read blocked by REFERENCE_EXISTS can never complete, so it could never
lift read-only mode: a stage writing a NEW file deadlocked (writes filtered,
every read of the not-yet-created target blocked) until MAX_TOOL_ROUNDS.
Lift read-only on a REFERENCE_EXISTS block, and reword the block message to
tell the model to file_write directly. Regression test added.
Two orchestrator tool-gating behaviors (both touch SessionOrchestrator):
- Read-only switch: when a tool call is BLOCKed with READ_BEFORE_WRITE, derive a
read-only mode from the event log (block until a later FILE_READ completes) and
withhold FILE_WRITE tools from the next inference turn(s), so a weak model is
pushed down the read-then-write path instead of looping on the blocked write.
- require_task_decompose stage flag (TomlWorkflowLoader) + owesTaskDecompose guard:
a stage so marked cannot stage_complete until a task_decompose/task_create has
succeeded this stage. New task_planning workflow + prompt are the first consumer
(decompose-only: swoop codebase, emit a parent + DEPENDS_ON task graph, stop).
A stage's allowedTools only shaped which tool definitions were offered to
the model; the dispatch path resolved returned tool calls straight from the
full registry and executed them without checking stage membership. A
hallucinated, jailbroken, or edited-transcript tool call for any registered
tool would run unchecked (violating invariant #5 / policy-is-absolute).
dispatchToolCalls now rejects any tool call whose name is not in the stage's
allowedTools (STAGE_COMPLETE_TOOL exempt), emitting ToolExecutionRejectedEvent
and feeding an error ContextEntry back to the model instead of executing.
Empty allowedTools means deny-all domain tools, consistent with offering
only STAGE_COMPLETE_TOOL at inference time.
A steering note attached to a tool approval was recorded but only
consumed by the NEXT stage's prompt build (buildSteeringNoteEntries runs
once, before the tool loop), so on a single-stage task it had no visible
effect. Two changes:
- Approve+note: capture userDecision.userSteering at the gate and inject
it as a context entry right after the tool result, so the same stage's
loop re-infers with the note and the model acts on it.
- Reject: buildSteeringNoteEntries now also emits anti-repeat feedback for
REJECTED decisions with no note, so the model does not re-propose the
identical call on the retryable re-run (a bare reject previously fed
back only "approval denied").
Integration test drives an approval with a steering note and asserts the
next inference's context carries it.
Tools can declare how their output is compressed before it enters the
context pack, replacing uniform handling. Open-threads 6.3 / ADR-0003.
- core:tools/compression: ToolOutputCompressor interface,
IdentityCompressor default, declarative OutputCompressionSpec +
CompressionRule (StripBlankLines, StripLeadingWhitespace,
DropMatching, HeadTail), and the pure DeclarativeCompressor engine
(regexes compiled at construction; bypassOnError passes raw on
non-zero exit; never throws on input).
- Tool gains `outputCompressor` (default IdentityCompressor). FileReadTool
strips blanks + leading whitespace; ShellTool strips blanks + head/tail.
- SessionOrchestrator applies the resolved tool's compressor on the
ToolResult -> ContextEntry path only. Raw output stays authoritative
in the event log (invariant #6); compression is a pure function of
(raw, exitCode, spec), so no new event and replay stays deterministic.
- Spec is @Serializable/config-shaped (JSON round-trip tested). No
custom-tool-from-config path exists today, so first-party tools wire
in code; TOML-declared compression rides along when that path lands.
Tier B (format-aware parsers: failures-only test output, git-log oneline)
is a documented per-tool extension behind the interface, not built here.
Implements the full vertical slice for invariant #9 tool-call assessment:
- core:toolintent — new module with ToolCallRule seam, ToolCallAssessor,
WorldProbe/FileSystemWorldProbe, WorkspacePolicy, PathContainmentRule,
and RiskMapping (assessment → RiskSummary / AssessedIssue)
- core:tools — ToolCallAssessmentRecord + ToolInvocationRecord.assessment
field; DefaultToolReducer handles ToolCallAssessedEvent (replay proof)
- core:config — ToolsConfig gains workspaceRoot + privilegedLocations;
ConfigLoader parses both; DEFAULT_PRIVILEGED_LOCATIONS built-in
- core:kernel — OrchestratorEngines gains toolCallAssessor/workspacePolicy/
worldProbe fields; SessionOrchestrator.dispatchToolCalls runs
runPlane2Assessment before the tier gate: BLOCK → hard-reject without
executing; PROMPT_USER → elevates tier into approval path with plane2Risk
in the ApprovalRequestedEvent
- apps/server — constructs PathContainmentRule + ToolCallAssessor +
WorkspacePolicy from config and wires them into OrchestratorEngines
Assessment is recorded as ToolCallAssessedEvent (environment observed once,
facts stored, replay reads events — invariant #9). Assessor and WorldProbe
are only invoked on the live orchestrator path, never in replay.
kami