The v3 stack, previously an uncommitted working tree, plus this session's two
units and the burn-in instrument. This commit is the burn-in build identity:
coordinator and worker must both report this revision before a task is created.
Workflow (earlier sessions, uncommitted until now): human decision events and
reduction, source cursors and reconcile-before-launch, turn-boundary
reconciliation, internal/agentctx as the single renderer, ace-fca phases with
sealed artifacts, the trajectory gate, bounded grilling, independent review,
task pr enforcement, and human review reflection.
Capability restrictions at the agent boundary: an authz.Agent surface at
GatedWrite may ask and may not act. It also fixes two bugs the unit exposed --
gated surfaces could not reach the two endpoints written for them, and
RequestHumanDecision would block an unowned task while rejecting a question
from the session that did own it.
Turn-boundary reconcile-failure escalation: a streak of consecutive failures
asks the session to hand off, fenced on the lease epoch, with reconcile_failure
as a real handoff reason. The worker was dropping the coordinator's verdict on
the floor; it now acts on it.
Burn-in: herdr.WriteLaunchContext dumps the exact agentctx.Build result to
<worktree>/.orchestra/launch.md at every launch, local and federated. BURNIN.md
is the runbook. deploy/build.sh stamps both binaries from one commit.
go build, go vet and go test ./... pass, 20 packages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The UI is a full control plane: it can create tasks, release or complete
them, and inject approval keystrokes into live panes. authz.HTTP did cover
it (an absent surface header defaults to Web), but the gate is opt-in and
the deployed env sets no tokens while binding all interfaces, so in
practice it was reachable unauthenticated from the LAN. Setting the token
alone did not work either: a browser cannot put a bearer token on a
document load, so the UI would 401 on index.html.
- ORCHESTRA_WEB_TOKEN is now mandatory; startup fails rather than silently
serving an open control plane.
- authz.Sessions issues random values stored SHA-256-hashed, with a TTL,
so a leaked snapshot yields nothing usable.
- POST /v1/ui/session verifies the token in constant time and returns it
as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure cookie. This is a presentable
form of the same credential, not a new authority.
- HTTPWithSessions accepts that cookie in place of the bearer token, and
only for the Web surface. The login endpoint and non-/v1/ GETs (the SPA
shell) are exempt by necessity; every /v1/ control path stays gated.
Note this is a breaking config change: .orchestra-config/orchestra.env
sets no tokens, so the service will not start until it does, and setting a
Web token newly gates the other /v1/ surfaces that default to Web.
AUDIT.md is reconciled against the code rather than against itself. B14,
B15 and B16 are closed with their evidence; B17 is closed on the worker
path only; the stale claim that B13 was open is corrected. Adds the
previously undocumented command channel and web UI, and files what that
implementation pass surfaced: federated approvals emit no event (B19), the
local capture revision is a timestamp rather than a change counter and can
silently defeat approvals (B20), the command queue never prunes (B21), the
ntfy token serves two unrelated purposes (S12), and a dead copy of the
authorization policy sits in main.go (S13).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
System means "the plane itself, in-process" (router, coordinator, adapters,
lease-expiry reclaim) and is unconditionally FullControl with no token
gate. But it was reachable straight from the X-Orchestra-Surface HTTP
header, both in authz.HTTP's token check and in main.go's own `surface`
closure (which every handler actually calls to authorize an event — it
re-parses the header independently of what the HTTP middleware resolved).
Since no deployment configures ORCHESTRA_SYSTEM_TOKEN (no legitimate HTTP
caller should ever need one), tokens[System] is always "", so the token
check was skipped entirely: any LAN request with
"X-Orchestra-Surface: system" got unauthenticated full control to emit any
event on any task.
Both the authz.HTTP middleware and main.go's `surface` closure now
downgrade System to Web before doing anything else with it, so the header
can never resolve to System over HTTP regardless of token config.
AUDIT.md B8.
Pre-existing uncommitted work found at session start: rotation now emits
anchor_sha on TaskReleased (previously silently dropped by store.Append
validation), multi-repo Gitea provider support, per-project git worktree
roots, and associated test coverage. Committing as a checkpoint before
starting remediation work tracked in AUDIT.md.
kami
kami