Files
orchestra/internal/authz/authz_test.go
T
kami 0b4b52ac45 Require a token for the web UI and reconcile AUDIT.md
The UI is a full control plane: it can create tasks, release or complete
them, and inject approval keystrokes into live panes. authz.HTTP did cover
it (an absent surface header defaults to Web), but the gate is opt-in and
the deployed env sets no tokens while binding all interfaces, so in
practice it was reachable unauthenticated from the LAN. Setting the token
alone did not work either: a browser cannot put a bearer token on a
document load, so the UI would 401 on index.html.

- ORCHESTRA_WEB_TOKEN is now mandatory; startup fails rather than silently
  serving an open control plane.
- authz.Sessions issues random values stored SHA-256-hashed, with a TTL,
  so a leaked snapshot yields nothing usable.
- POST /v1/ui/session verifies the token in constant time and returns it
  as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure cookie. This is a presentable
  form of the same credential, not a new authority.
- HTTPWithSessions accepts that cookie in place of the bearer token, and
  only for the Web surface. The login endpoint and non-/v1/ GETs (the SPA
  shell) are exempt by necessity; every /v1/ control path stays gated.

Note this is a breaking config change: .orchestra-config/orchestra.env
sets no tokens, so the service will not start until it does, and setting a
Web token newly gates the other /v1/ surfaces that default to Web.

AUDIT.md is reconciled against the code rather than against itself. B14,
B15 and B16 are closed with their evidence; B17 is closed on the worker
path only; the stale claim that B13 was open is corrected. Adds the
previously undocumented command channel and web UI, and files what that
implementation pass surfaced: federated approvals emit no event (B19), the
local capture revision is a timestamp rather than a change counter and can
silently defeat approvals (B20), the command queue never prunes (B21), the
ntfy token serves two unrelated purposes (S12), and a dead copy of the
authorization policy sits in main.go (S13).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
2026-07-28 23:15:00 +04:00

113 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package authz
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestSurfaceCapabilities(t *testing.T) {
if Telegram.CanEmit("TaskCreated") || Ntfy.CanEmit("ApprovalRequested") {
t.Fatal("notify surface emitted an event")
}
if !TUI.CanEmit("TaskCreated") {
t.Fatal("control surface cannot emit")
}
if !MCP.CanEmit("ApprovalRequested") || MCP.CanEmit("TaskCreated") {
t.Fatal("mcp gate is wrong")
}
}
// TestSystemSurfaceDowngradedByHTTPMiddleware guards half of B8: System
// means "the plane itself, in-process" and is always FullControl with no
// token gate, since no deployment configures a token for a surface no HTTP
// caller is meant to use. HTTP() must never let a request pass through
// treated as System, or a caller declaring X-Orchestra-Surface: system gets
// an unconditional, unauthenticated bypass of the token check below it.
// (Downstream handlers must independently avoid re-deriving System from the
// raw header themselves — see cmd/orchestra/main.go's `surface` closure,
// which this package cannot test directly.)
func TestSystemSurfaceDowngradedByHTTPMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
tokens := map[Surface]string{System: "should-never-be-checked"}
h := HTTP(tokens, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/tasks/t1/complete", nil)
req.Header.Set("X-Orchestra-Surface", "system")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
// System's token check is intentionally skipped by HTTP() (it downgrades
// to Web before the token comparison), so the request reaching the
// handler at all is expected here — the guard that matters is that
// nothing downstream can observe "system" as the resolved surface. This
// test documents the middleware's half of the fix; main.go's `surface`
// closure carries the other half.
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("unexpected status %d", rec.Code)
}
}
// B18: the web UI is a full control plane. A session cookie must be an
// alternative *presentation* of the Web token, never a widening of it.
func TestWebSessionCookieGatesControlPathsOnly(t *testing.T) {
tokens := map[Surface]string{Web: "secret"}
sessions := &Sessions{}
h := HTTPWithSessions(tokens, sessions, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
do := func(method, path string, c *http.Cookie, surface string) int {
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
if c != nil {
req.AddCookie(c)
}
if surface != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Orchestra-Surface", surface)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec.Code
}
if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", nil, ""); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("uncredentialed control path = %d, want 401", got)
}
// The SPA shell and the login endpoint must stay reachable, or no
// browser could ever obtain a cookie in the first place.
if got := do(http.MethodGet, "/index.html", nil, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("SPA shell = %d, want 200", got)
}
if got := do(http.MethodPost, SessionPath, nil, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("login endpoint = %d, want 200", got)
}
v, err := sessions.Issue()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: v}, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("session-cookie control path = %d, want 200", got)
}
if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: "forged"}, ""); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("forged cookie = %d, want 401", got)
}
// A cookie must not authenticate a non-browser surface.
tokens[TUI] = "tui-secret"
if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: v}, "tui"); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("cookie on TUI surface = %d, want 401", got)
}
}
func TestSessionExpires(t *testing.T) {
s := &Sessions{TTL: time.Millisecond}
v, err := s.Issue()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
if s.Valid(v) {
t.Fatal("expired session accepted")
}
if s.Valid("") {
t.Fatal("empty session accepted")
}
}