claude
0a2e194e76
Migrate the two remaining action-routing consumers from compatibility Decision.Slings fields to authoritative Decision.CapabilitySelection: - refusesCommand: reads CapabilitySelection.Fn instead of Slots.Fn - ActHasEntityTarget: reads CapabilitySelection.Resolved and CapabilitySelection.Args instead of Slots.HasFn and Slots.Args Slots.Text remains the source for entity text when positional args do not contain the target (unchanged). Regression tests prove: - prohibited sentinel preserved byte-for-byte through SelectCapability - blanked Slots.Fn/Args/HasFn do not affect migrated consumers - Praxis/Hexis entity-target routing unchanged - stage-0 deterministic act unchanged - classifier/extractor act unchanged do not remove the compatibility mirrors yet.
80 lines
2.5 KiB
Go
80 lines
2.5 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/kami/maven/internal/router"
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)
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// TestRefusesCommandUsesCapabilitySelection proves that refusesCommand reads
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// CapabilitySelection.Fn rather than the compatibility Slots.Fn. When
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// CapabilitySelection is populated with the prohibited sentinel but Slots.Fn
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// is blank, the refusal must still fire.
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func TestRefusesCommandUsesCapabilitySelection(t *testing.T) {
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dec := router.Decision{
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Intent: router.IntentAct,
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CapabilitySelection: router.CapabilitySelection{
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Fn: router.ProhibitedActFn,
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Resolved: true,
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},
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// Slots compatibility fields deliberately blank.
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}
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if !refusesCommand(dec) {
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t.Fatal("refusesCommand should return true when CapabilitySelection.Fn == ProhibitedActFn")
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}
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}
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// TestRefusesCommandUtteranceFallback proves that the utterance-based
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// prohibition check still works as a defense-in-depth belt when
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// CapabilitySelection does not carry the sentinel.
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func TestRefusesCommandUtteranceFallback(t *testing.T) {
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dec := router.Decision{
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Utterance: "don't restart nginx",
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}
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if !refusesCommand(dec) {
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t.Fatal("refusesCommand should return true for a prohibited utterance")
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}
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}
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// TestRefusesCommandNonProhibitedCapability proves that an act with a
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// non-prohibited capability is NOT refused even when Slots.Fn happens to
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// carry the prohibited sentinel (cross-contamination).
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func TestRefusesCommandNonProhibitedCapability(t *testing.T) {
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dec := router.Decision{
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Intent: router.IntentAct,
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Utterance: "restart nginx",
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CapabilitySelection: router.CapabilitySelection{
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Fn: "restart",
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Resolved: true,
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},
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}
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if refusesCommand(dec) {
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t.Fatal("refusesCommand should return false for a non-prohibited capability")
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}
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}
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// TestRefusesCommandProhibitedSentinelPreservedThroughPipeline proves that the
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// command-prohibition grammar sentinel survives through SelectCapability into
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// CapabilitySelection byte-for-byte.
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func TestRefusesCommandProhibitedSentinelPreservedThroughPipeline(t *testing.T) {
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dec := router.Decision{
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Intent: router.IntentAct,
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Slots: router.Slots{
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Fn: router.ProhibitedActFn,
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HasFn: true,
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},
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}
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sel := router.SelectCapability(dec, nil)
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dec.CapabilitySelection = sel
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if dec.CapabilitySelection.Fn != router.ProhibitedActFn {
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t.Errorf("CapabilitySelection.Fn = %q, want %q", dec.CapabilitySelection.Fn, router.ProhibitedActFn)
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}
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if !dec.CapabilitySelection.Resolved {
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t.Error("CapabilitySelection.Resolved should be true")
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}
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if !refusesCommand(dec) {
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t.Fatal("refusesCommand should return true after pipeline preserves the sentinel")
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}
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}
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