Require a token for the web UI and reconcile AUDIT.md
The UI is a full control plane: it can create tasks, release or complete them, and inject approval keystrokes into live panes. authz.HTTP did cover it (an absent surface header defaults to Web), but the gate is opt-in and the deployed env sets no tokens while binding all interfaces, so in practice it was reachable unauthenticated from the LAN. Setting the token alone did not work either: a browser cannot put a bearer token on a document load, so the UI would 401 on index.html. - ORCHESTRA_WEB_TOKEN is now mandatory; startup fails rather than silently serving an open control plane. - authz.Sessions issues random values stored SHA-256-hashed, with a TTL, so a leaked snapshot yields nothing usable. - POST /v1/ui/session verifies the token in constant time and returns it as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure cookie. This is a presentable form of the same credential, not a new authority. - HTTPWithSessions accepts that cookie in place of the bearer token, and only for the Web surface. The login endpoint and non-/v1/ GETs (the SPA shell) are exempt by necessity; every /v1/ control path stays gated. Note this is a breaking config change: .orchestra-config/orchestra.env sets no tokens, so the service will not start until it does, and setting a Web token newly gates the other /v1/ surfaces that default to Web. AUDIT.md is reconciled against the code rather than against itself. B14, B15 and B16 are closed with their evidence; B17 is closed on the worker path only; the stale claim that B13 was open is corrected. Adds the previously undocumented command channel and web UI, and files what that implementation pass surfaced: federated approvals emit no event (B19), the local capture revision is a timestamp rather than a change counter and can silently defeat approvals (B20), the command queue never prunes (B21), the ntfy token serves two unrelated purposes (S12), and a dead copy of the authorization policy sits in main.go (S13). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func TestSurfaceCapabilities(t *testing.T) {
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@@ -46,3 +47,66 @@ func TestSystemSurfaceDowngradedByHTTPMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected status %d", rec.Code)
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}
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}
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// B18: the web UI is a full control plane. A session cookie must be an
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// alternative *presentation* of the Web token, never a widening of it.
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func TestWebSessionCookieGatesControlPathsOnly(t *testing.T) {
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tokens := map[Surface]string{Web: "secret"}
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sessions := &Sessions{}
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h := HTTPWithSessions(tokens, sessions, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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do := func(method, path string, c *http.Cookie, surface string) int {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
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if c != nil {
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req.AddCookie(c)
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}
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if surface != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Orchestra-Surface", surface)
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}
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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return rec.Code
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}
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if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", nil, ""); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("uncredentialed control path = %d, want 401", got)
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}
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// The SPA shell and the login endpoint must stay reachable, or no
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// browser could ever obtain a cookie in the first place.
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if got := do(http.MethodGet, "/index.html", nil, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("SPA shell = %d, want 200", got)
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}
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if got := do(http.MethodPost, SessionPath, nil, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("login endpoint = %d, want 200", got)
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}
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v, err := sessions.Issue()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: v}, ""); got != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("session-cookie control path = %d, want 200", got)
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}
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if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/ui/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: "forged"}, ""); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("forged cookie = %d, want 401", got)
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}
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// A cookie must not authenticate a non-browser surface.
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tokens[TUI] = "tui-secret"
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if got := do(http.MethodPost, "/v1/tasks", &http.Cookie{Name: SessionCookie, Value: v}, "tui"); got != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("cookie on TUI surface = %d, want 401", got)
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}
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}
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func TestSessionExpires(t *testing.T) {
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s := &Sessions{TTL: time.Millisecond}
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v, err := s.Issue()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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time.Sleep(5 * time.Millisecond)
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if s.Valid(v) {
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t.Fatal("expired session accepted")
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}
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if s.Valid("") {
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t.Fatal("empty session accepted")
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}
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}
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