feat: enforce event authorization and readiness
This commit is contained in:
+34
-4
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ func main() {
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rt = &router.Router{Store: s, Registry: rr, Reachability: registry.TCPReachability{}, Timeout: time.Second, Retry: router.RetryPolicy{MaxAttempts: 3, Backoff: time.Minute}}
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}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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surface := func(r *http.Request) authz.Surface {
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v := authz.ParseSurface(r.Header.Get("X-Orchestra-Surface"))
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if v == "" {
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return authz.Web
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}
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return v
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}
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mux.HandleFunc("/v1/tasks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method == "GET" {
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(s.Tasks())
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@@ -104,7 +111,19 @@ func main() {
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}
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taskID, action := parts[2], parts[3]
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if action == "approval" {
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if err := authz.AuthorizeEvent(surface(r), map[bool]string{true: "ApprovalRequested", false: "ApprovalGranted"}[len(parts) == 4]); err != nil && len(parts) == 4 {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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if len(parts) == 5 {
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typ := "ApprovalGranted"
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if parts[4] == "deny" {
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typ = "ApprovalDenied"
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}
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if err := authz.AuthorizeEvent(surface(r), typ); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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if parts[4] != "grant" && parts[4] != "deny" {
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http.Error(w, "unknown approval action", 404)
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return
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@@ -118,10 +137,6 @@ func main() {
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if by == "" {
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by = "surface"
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}
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typ := "ApprovalGranted"
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if parts[4] == "deny" {
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typ = "ApprovalDenied"
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}
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b, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"subject_ref": taskID, "by": by})
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e := domain.Event{ID: id(), Type: typ, TaskID: taskID, Version: t.Version + 1, Payload: b}
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if err := s.Append(e); err != nil {
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@@ -154,6 +169,13 @@ func main() {
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}
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var e domain.Event
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var err error
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actionTypes := map[string]string{"lease": "TaskLeased", "release": "TaskReleased", "complete": "TaskCompleted", "block": "TaskBlocked"}
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if typ, known := actionTypes[action]; known {
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if err := authz.AuthorizeEvent(surface(r), typ); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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switch action {
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case "lease":
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var p struct {
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@@ -230,6 +252,14 @@ func main() {
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}()
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}
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mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.Write([]byte("ok\n")) })
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mux.HandleFunc("/readyz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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checks := map[string]any{"store": true, "router": rt != nil, "gitea": os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_URL") != "", "jsonl": os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_JSONL") != ""}
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ready := rt != nil || (os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_CONFIG") == "")
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if !ready {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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}
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"ready": ready, "checks": checks})
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})
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if base := os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_URL"); base != "" {
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g := provider.Gitea{BaseURL: base, Token: os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_TOKEN"), WebhookSecret: os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_WEBHOOK_SECRET"), Owner: os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_OWNER"), Repo: os.Getenv("ORCHESTRA_GITEA_REPO")}
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mux.Handle("/v1/providers/gitea/webhook", g.WebhookHandler(s))
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+3
-1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Updated: 2026-07-26
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- **Snapshots are written but never loaded or used for replay acceleration.** Startup always replays the complete event log.
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- **Task creation projection is incomplete.** `parent`, `due`, `inherent_priority`, and `estimate` are defined in the domain model but are not projected from `TaskCreated` payloads.
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- **Occupancy support is incomplete relative to the spec.** Native readers exist, but Codex active-session discovery, opencode server/SSE plus fallback, and coordinator monitoring are not implemented.
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- **Authorization is only partially enforced.** HTTP method restrictions exist, but handlers do not consistently call `AuthorizeEvent`; an absent surface defaults to full-control Web.
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- **Authorization is mostly enforced at HTTP ingress.** Lifecycle and approval handlers now call `AuthorizeEvent`; an absent surface still defaults to full-control Web, and non-HTTP/event-bus integrations remain unwired.
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The first pass closed the store/API defects (lifecycle defaults, CAS content verification, validated replay, snapshot loading, and projection of task metadata) and added optional Gitea webhook/poll wiring. The remaining server-side gaps are below.
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@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ The first pass closed the store/API defects (lifecycle defaults, CAS content ver
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- **Federated worker behavior is not complete.** Machine affinity filtering is implemented, but there is no worker registration/heartbeat protocol, remote event transport, cross-machine worktree coordination, or server-side synchronization status beyond local git inspection.
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- **The server API is narrower than the spec.** There are no explicit task amendment/report/handoff upload endpoints, event subscription/streaming endpoint, health/readiness detail for providers and herdrs, or administrative endpoints for project/machine/herdr status.
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The latest pass now applies `AuthorizeEvent` to lifecycle and approval writes and adds `/readyz` with router/provider configuration checks. Readiness is configuration-level only; it does not yet probe herdr/provider health.
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Recommended order:
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1. Add the orchestration coordinator: lease → worktree → harness session → bootstrap → lifecycle events.
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