Burn-in run 2 recorded TaskLaunchAcknowledged, opened a pane, and ran nothing
for fifteen minutes. The launch instruction sat in Claude Code's input editor
as "[Pasted text #1 +66 lines]" at zero tokens and zero elapsed. Two separate
bugs produced that.
The transport was wrong for the harness. TmuxBackend.Prompt writes the whole
instruction with send-keys -l and then sends Enter, and the TUI coalesces the
fast multi-line write into a paste that absorbs the following Enter. Launch
transport is now a backend property rather than one universal prompt format:
claude on tmux submits a single line pointing at .orchestra/launch.md, every
other harness keeps the inline path it was verified on. agentctx is unchanged
and the file still holds the exact bytes Orchestra rendered, so what the agent
receives is identical either way. Under the file transport a failed write is
now a failed launch, because there the file is the instruction.
The acknowledgement was also wrong. It meant "Prompt returned nil", not "the
harness accepted the prompt". Backends may now implement ConfirmLaunch, and
the tmux one polls until the input editor clears and the agent is observably
busy, blocked on approval, or at least no longer holding the text. An editor
that still holds the prompt at the deadline is a definite failure. The worker
kills the pane, drops the session so the retry starts clean, and returns
ErrPromptNotSubmitted, which classifies as prompt_not_submitted rather than
launch_uncertain. That class already falls through to TaskReleased, so the
existing retry path takes it and no lease is held on a launch that never
happened.
The confirmation bound is tunable because how fast a terminal harness reacts
is a property of the host. It is not a sleep before the submit: the submit is
deterministic, and this waits for the harness to visibly react to it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gitea ingest set title, description and capability but never acceptance, so
every Gitea-sourced task rendered "Acceptance: Not stated." however carefully
its body was written. F2 restored the body; it did not wire the field.
The convention is deliberately tiny. A markdown heading spelled "acceptance"
or "acceptance criteria" opens the section, bullet and checklist items until
the next heading become the criteria in order, checkbox markers are stripped,
empty items are dropped, and the whole section leaves the description so a
criterion is never also read as instruction prose. Nothing else is recognized:
inferring acceptance from arbitrary prose would eventually invent a
requirement, and a fabricated criterion outranks every human decision beneath
it in the authority order.
An absent section yields no acceptance, which is not an ingestion failure. The
task renders "Not stated." and the frame phase resolves it through the
decision-request path, where a human answers instead of the parser guessing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Burn-in run 2 ingested its task and then sat queued forever. Every herdr in
the live config declares quota_limit_5h and quota_limit_weekly, the event log
holds zero QuotaReported events, and QuotaSince reported an empty window as
unknown. QuotaAvailability fails closed on unknown, so no harness could ever
be leased, and the only producer of a receipt is a completed lease.
The event log is Orchestra's whole accounting source, so a window holding no
receipts is observable zero consumption. QuotaSince now reports known for an
empty window and for a harness that has never reported. A receipt that
declares its own consumption unknown still fails closed.
The refusal also lied about its cause. federatedAvailability collapsed a base
gate refusal into the federation health string, so router health said "stale
heartbeat or unhealthy local backend" while the heartbeat was one second old.
Availability gates now name themselves through an optional
ReasonedAvailability contract: quota refusals say whether usage is unknown or
the window is exhausted and by how much, and worker refusals distinguish an
unregistered worker, a never-probed backend, a stale heartbeat, a stale
health check, and an unreachable backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This checkout is shared with another session. Its uncommitted Go changes must
neither be compiled into a binary stamped with a commit revision nor block a
deploy, and a dirty-tree refusal does both jobs badly. deploy/build.sh now
builds in a detached worktree of the revision it stamps, and the container image
is built the same way rather than from the live checkout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The API was in a restart loop, exiting with `invalid event: until_ns required`.
ValidateEvent compared until_ns against time.Now() for TaskLeased and
TaskLeaseRenewed, so a lease event that was valid when written failed validation
once it expired. store.Open replays the log tail after the snapshot and
log.Fatal's on the first invalid event, so the coordinator refused its own
history and could not start.
Validation of a durable event must be time-independent. Well-formedness is this
function's question; freshness belongs to Store.Lease and Store.ExpireLeases,
which compute until_ns themselves.
Latent since the field was introduced. It needed a renewal in the post-snapshot
tail plus a restart after that renewal expired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A task in retry backoff was filtered out before the candidate loop, so it
recorded no rejection at all: queued, apparently assignable, and silent. That is
the exact shape that made F5 take a live session to diagnose. It now reports
"retry backoff until <time>".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F7, security. An unset surface token makes the middleware skip its check, so a
full-control surface with no credential is an open control plane rather than a
closed one. With ORCHESTRA_TUI_TOKEN unset, any LAN caller could lease, release,
complete or block any task by declaring one header, which is how this session's
manual leases were issued. authz.RequireCredentials now refuses startup instead
of logging. Web is exempt: Sessions makes its login mandatory.
F5, lifecycle. router.go's silent `continue` was the first bug, not the
predicate behind it. Every eligibility gate now records a router.Rejection with
task, herdr and reason, exposed at GET /v1/router/health, reset per pass. No
gate was weakened: a direct Store.Lease succeeding proves the lease path, not
that eligibility should have selected that worker.
F8, correctness. Reconcile iterated every configured source for every task, so a
task's external id was looked up in whatever repository each source pointed at.
Once two repositories share an issue number, an unrelated human comment becomes
an authoritative decision for the wrong task. Reconciliation is now bound to
task.Source, the provider:project identity the ingest stamped, and a source that
cannot prove it owns the task is skipped. A task with no matching source
reconciles to nothing and still launches, because nothing to import is not a
failure to read.
The integration fixture ingested from "jsonl" while reconciling from "gitea",
which is exactly the shape F8 makes impossible; it now ingests from the source
it reconciles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The .orchestra directory showed up as untracked work in the very worktree whose
own launch context said "uncommitted changes: false". It would have polluted
the quality gate, the review diff, and the agent's reading of git status. A
.gitignore of "*" inside the directory ignores it including itself. The
worker's done marker lives there too and had the same problem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by reading .orchestra/launch.md on the first burn-in task. The rendered
context said `Acceptance: Not stated.` and carried the issue title as the whole
goal, because Gitea.event parsed the issue body and then dropped it from the
TaskCreated payload.
The body is the task's own statement of what it wants, which every rendered
context ranks above continuity and below only a human decision. The store
already reads `description` from TaskCreated; only the provider was silent.
Every Gitea-sourced task so far has therefore run on its title alone. Classify
as an authority bug, not a model-following failure: no agent could have known
what it was not told.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found live on the first burn-in task. Every federated launch failed with
`effective intent: federation: 401 Unauthorized: unauthorized surface`, and the
task nacked back to queued.
GET /v1/tasks/<id>/intent was added so a worker renders its own launch
instruction from the reduced intent, but authz.HTTPWithSessions never got the
matching worker-path exemption. An unlabelled request defaults to the Web
surface, which is session-gated, so the one caller the endpoint exists for could
never reach it.
Twenty test packages passed throughout, because the authz tests covered the
surface capability table and not the worker path list. Only the live owner path
established this.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The burn-in pairs a coordinator with a worker, and step one of every run is
checking that both report the burn-in commit. That was only visible behind the
operator login, at /v1/admin/diagnostics and /v1/federation/workers, and the
worker never logged its own revision at all. Both now print it on startup, so
`docker logs orchestra-api` and `journalctl -u orchestra-worker` are enough.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The v3 stack, previously an uncommitted working tree, plus this session's two
units and the burn-in instrument. This commit is the burn-in build identity:
coordinator and worker must both report this revision before a task is created.
Workflow (earlier sessions, uncommitted until now): human decision events and
reduction, source cursors and reconcile-before-launch, turn-boundary
reconciliation, internal/agentctx as the single renderer, ace-fca phases with
sealed artifacts, the trajectory gate, bounded grilling, independent review,
task pr enforcement, and human review reflection.
Capability restrictions at the agent boundary: an authz.Agent surface at
GatedWrite may ask and may not act. It also fixes two bugs the unit exposed --
gated surfaces could not reach the two endpoints written for them, and
RequestHumanDecision would block an unowned task while rejecting a question
from the session that did own it.
Turn-boundary reconcile-failure escalation: a streak of consecutive failures
asks the session to hand off, fenced on the lease epoch, with reconcile_failure
as a real handoff reason. The worker was dropping the coordinator's verdict on
the floor; it now acts on it.
Burn-in: herdr.WriteLaunchContext dumps the exact agentctx.Build result to
<worktree>/.orchestra/launch.md at every launch, local and federated. BURNIN.md
is the runbook. deploy/build.sh stamps both binaries from one commit.
go build, go vet and go test ./... pass, 20 packages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Acts on the seven review comments on PR #1.
Design A is gone (comment 4). clients/ deleted rather than tracked: with
workers carrying cross-machine work the bridge is undeployed, which supersedes
the 2026-07-27 "keep through Phase 5" decision. CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md and
AUDIT.md updated from "retained" to "deleted".
The harness-hook completion path is gone (comment 10). Investigation of the
live OpenCode QA run showed orchestra-worker owns completion end to end: it
watches for .orchestra/done, confirms via AgentStatus that the agent is not
busy, then posts through /v1/federation/* with both lease epoch and expected
version. The hook scripts used a different, older convention
(.orchestra-report.md) and posted to /v1/harness/complete, which had already
been reduced to a 410 stub - so that path could not have completed a task.
Nothing exercised it, because the live run never used it. Deleted: the three
deploy/hooks scripts, the 410 route, the unmounted harnessCompletion handler,
and its test. That test passed against a handler no mux routed to, which is
the exact "looks wired but isn't" pattern CLAUDE.md warns about; the
constant-time token compare added to it earlier today goes with it, having
never been reachable. /v1/harness/turn is untouched and still live.
Retired deployment files (comments 8, 12, 14): deploy/orchestra.service and
deploy/redeploy.sh (which sudo-installed to /usr/local/bin and restarted that
unit), plus deploy/docker-api-entrypoint.sh. The entrypoint was safe to remove
once its premise was checked: env vars reach the container through
`env_file: .env` in compose.yaml, not by sourcing /etc/orchestra/orchestra.env
- only config.jsonc is bind-mounted there - and Dockerfile.api's line 17
already sets ORCHESTRA_DATA/ORCHESTRA_PORT. Dockerfile.api now execs
/app/orchestra directly. orchestra-worker.service is a different, current unit
and is kept.
deploy/config.example.json deleted as a duplicate (comment 6); the annotated
.jsonc is the one registry.go points at, and its header no longer tells the
reader to copy the file that just went away.
Documentation corrected beyond the deletions:
- CLAUDE.md's deployment section claimed the container bind-mounts
/etc/orchestra:ro and its entrypoint sources the env file. Both wrong.
- AGENTS.md still described a systemd deployment on homesrv as of 2026-07-27.
- AUDIT.md's H5 row still described a "retained compatibility handler".
- deploy/DEPLOYMENT.md still named redeploy.sh as the deployment path.
- deploy/orchestra.env.example still cited EnvironmentFile=.
TOKEN_MINIMAL_WORKFLOW_PLAN.md (comment 2) is untouched: it and WEB_UI_PLAN.md
were both missed by REVIEW.md's documentation sweep, and reconciling a 534-line
forward-looking plan against AUDIT.md is its own task, not a review fixup.
Verified: go build ./..., go vet ./..., go test ./... all pass after the
deletions, and go list ./... has no node_modules entry. No live herdr or pane
was touched; nothing was deployed. The running image still predates this
commit until compose is rebuilt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GEugbHVYfAXFpTqDYbByEB
Acts on the 2026-07-30 senior review (REVIEW.md findings 1, 2, 4, 5, 7).
Docs (finding 1): CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md both claimed Design B "has zero
clients - no worker binary exists". cmd/orchestra-worker/main.go is the
deployed worker, and the non-local-herdr guardrail has landed in
Coordinator.adapterFor. Both sections rewritten; AUDIT.md gains a matching
federation-status record. The Phase 5 retention / Phase 6 deletion decision
for Design A is preserved, not flattened.
clients/ un-ignored and tracked, including the .service unit and README:
deployed code belongs in version control. Design A is NOT deleted here.
progress.md (finding 2): the file was deleted after 636ed8a, yet CLAUDE.md
instructed every session to cross-check against it. References removed from
CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, internal/orchestrator/rotation_test.go (comment only)
and deploy/hooks/orchestra-codex-poll.sh; AUDIT.md now carries the log role.
web/go.mod (finding 4): a module stub ends the parent package graph at the
directory boundary, so go list ./... no longer yields
web/node_modules/flatted/golang/pkg/flatted. A build tag cannot work - the
package is in the package list before tags are evaluated. Local/CI-only
breakage: Dockerfile.api builds ./cmd/orchestra by explicit path and
.dockerignore already excluded node_modules.
orchestra-worker (finding 5): untracked (8.9MB, mode 100755, still on disk);
both binaries now gitignored.
Token compare (finding 7): cmd/orchestra/main.go:139,582 use
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare, matching the authz.go idiom. The token != ""
guard stays first, so an empty configured token still means auth-disabled
rather than auth-bypass. Three further plain != secret compares remain in
internal/federation/federation.go:343,346,368 - tracked, not fixed here.
Also included from the review pass: orchestrator.go records adapter-resolution
failures in SessionHealth.LastError instead of dropping them on a bare
continue, plus an Observed flag so lease-seeded health is not mistaken for a
live reading, with a covering test. GET /v1/tasks/<id>/health now returns a
record with last_error where it previously returned a bare 404.
REVIEW.md's own second pass claimed every checkable fact held up; four did
not. AUDIT.md never contained the false Design B claim (AGENTS.md was the
second copy), the guardrail is at orchestrator.go:312 not :309, the
progress.md site list missed the codex-poll hook, and only orchestra-worker
was tracked. Verified: go build, go vet, go test, and
go list ./... | grep node_modules all clean with every change applied
together. No live herdr or pane was touched; nothing was deployed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GEugbHVYfAXFpTqDYbByEB
The deployment moved from orchestra.service to Docker Compose, but both
CLAUDE.md and AUDIT.md still described the systemd unit. A stopped unit
plus a stale /usr/local/bin/orchestra reads exactly like a dead service,
so document where the live deployment actually is and that deploying now
means rebuilding the compose images.
Also record what a live check found: the running image predates the B18
auth commit, all six herdrs are unreachable (the sole remaining blocker
on live proof for B13-B17), GET /v1/tasks has no authz gate but sits
behind a ufw-restricted bind, and ntfy still 403s.
Sharpen the herdr-logging note: successes are never logged, so a herdr
with no log line is up, not down, and the logs can't confirm one coming
back. Probe the ports directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
All five defects filed while implementing B18, plus the router flake that
predated them. None of this has run on the deployed instance: the service
is stopped and /usr/local/bin/orchestra predates every change here.
B20 is the one that could silently defeat approvals. The capture revision
was UnixNano, so it changed on every read and said nothing about whether
the pane had changed; it is now an FNV-1a hash of the pane text, changing
iff the text does. The worse half was precedence: capture() preferred the
coordinator over a published worker capture, handing Queue a timestamp the
owning worker's staleness check could never match, so every federated
approval resolved "stale" and the keystroke never happened. Worker captures
now win — their existence means a registered worker owns that pane — and
capturePane follows the same precedence via Capture.Source rather than
guessing.
B19 was filed as "federated approvals emit no event", which overstated it:
the resolution half already existed, and correctly fires only on an
acknowledged worker report. The missing half was the request. Server.action
now appends ApprovalRequested at queue time, subject_ref set to the command
ID the later resolution carries. If that append fails the queued command is
resolved "rejected" — a keystroke that left no audit trail must not run.
B21 bounds the command list: resolved commands prune after 30 minutes on
both Queue and Commands, pending ones never at any age, since dropping one
would discard an operator decision. The persistence half stays open and is
recorded as such — captures and commands are still in-memory only.
S12 splits ORCHESTRA_NTFY_TOKEN, which was both the secret handed to the
ntfy server and a valid inbound credential for the ntfy surface; the latter
is now ORCHESTRA_NTFY_SURFACE_TOKEN. Breaking: a deployment relying on the
old dual use has no inbound gate until it sets the new variable. S13
deletes the dead auth() copy of the authorization policy.
The router flake was in the test, not in assignment. Store.Tasks() ranges a
map, and the assertion indexed two separate Tasks() calls, failing whenever
the orderings disagreed; instrumenting it showed a valid TaskLeased and a
genuinely leased task on every "failing" run. It now snapshots once and
asserts that exactly one task is leased, and passes at -count=60.
AUDIT.md records what is still not done: the deployed env and binary, the
live re-verification B13-B17 has always lacked, and two operational faults
found in the journal that block it — all six herdrs are refusing
connections, and ntfy delivery is failing 403 on every send.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
The UI is a full control plane: it can create tasks, release or complete
them, and inject approval keystrokes into live panes. authz.HTTP did cover
it (an absent surface header defaults to Web), but the gate is opt-in and
the deployed env sets no tokens while binding all interfaces, so in
practice it was reachable unauthenticated from the LAN. Setting the token
alone did not work either: a browser cannot put a bearer token on a
document load, so the UI would 401 on index.html.
- ORCHESTRA_WEB_TOKEN is now mandatory; startup fails rather than silently
serving an open control plane.
- authz.Sessions issues random values stored SHA-256-hashed, with a TTL,
so a leaked snapshot yields nothing usable.
- POST /v1/ui/session verifies the token in constant time and returns it
as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure cookie. This is a presentable
form of the same credential, not a new authority.
- HTTPWithSessions accepts that cookie in place of the bearer token, and
only for the Web surface. The login endpoint and non-/v1/ GETs (the SPA
shell) are exempt by necessity; every /v1/ control path stays gated.
Note this is a breaking config change: .orchestra-config/orchestra.env
sets no tokens, so the service will not start until it does, and setting a
Web token newly gates the other /v1/ surfaces that default to Web.
AUDIT.md is reconciled against the code rather than against itself. B14,
B15 and B16 are closed with their evidence; B17 is closed on the worker
path only; the stale claim that B13 was open is corrected. Adds the
previously undocumented command channel and web UI, and files what that
implementation pass surfaced: federated approvals emit no event (B19), the
local capture revision is a timestamp rather than a change counter and can
silently defeat approvals (B20), the command queue never prunes (B21), the
ntfy token serves two unrelated purposes (S12), and a dead copy of the
authorization policy sits in main.go (S13).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
Introduces the browser-facing surface and the worker-side protocol that
backs it:
- internal/ui: joined read model plus per-task lifecycle and approval
controls, kept separate from the raw endpoints workers and harnesses
depend on.
- internal/webui + web/: Vite/React app, build output embedded via
go:embed and served as an SPA fallback.
- federation: per-(worker, task) captures with a monotonic revision that
advances only when pane text actually changes, and a command queue
restricted to grant_approval / deny_approval, each bound to the capture
revision the operator acted on.
- orchestra-worker: publishes captures and executes commands only after
re-reading the pane and confirming the revision still matches. Sends
keystrokes only for a visible y/n prompt or OpenCode's fully labelled
selector, and refuses to deny through that selector rather than guess
at unobservable navigation.
This is the ownership boundary AUDIT.md's B14 and B17 call for: approval
becomes an explicit, revision-bound operation executed by the worker that
owns the pane, instead of a side effect of prompting over a
coordinator-driven remote socket.
Also ignores the web build inputs and outputs. node_modules ships vendored
Go packages, so go build and go test walk into it if it is merely
untracked; both node_modules and .node_modules are excluded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01535A3Y8RtkAi8wYuWhtkEd
herdr hands a freshly created pane/agent back before it's actually ready,
and rejects the very next call with a range of different transient errors
("not an available shell", "not an active named agent", "target ... not
found") depending on timing. String-matching each wording as it turned up
live proved unwinnable across three live redeploy-and-test rounds, so
StartAgent and Prompt now retry any error for up to 15s (bounded by
wall-clock time, not attempt count) rather than pattern-matching herdr's
error text.
Confirmed live against workpc: a fresh lease (wD:p1) now reaches a real
attached claude session instead of failing before the agent starts.
Live testing also exposed a second, separate defect (B13, documented in
AUDIT.md, not fixed here): agent.start can return success while never
actually starting an agent when two leases land close together, with no
error for a retry to catch. Left three test panes on workpc untouched
(wD:p1, wE:p1, wF:p1) pending manual cleanup, per the standing rule against
destructive herdr calls without asking first.
Also folds in the already-flattened AUDIT.md/progress.md merge that was
staged ahead of this session's changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
The previous function_call/function_call_output shape was never verified
and doesn't exist in any real Codex rollout. Confirmed the real shape
against this machine's own ~/.codex/sessions files: file edits arrive as
event_msg/patch_apply_end (changes+success, no pairing needed), and shell
commands arrive as a freeform custom_tool_call named "exec" whose input is
a JS snippet embedding cmd:"..." rather than a flat arguments object, with
failure signaled by a literal "Script error:" prefix in the output text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
Closes the last two S11 triggers. internal/herdr/activity.go normalizes
tool/function calls per harness (ClaudeActivity verified against the
existing transcript format, CodexActivity best-effort/unverified,
OpenCodeActivity refuses — no confirmed per-tool-call source exists) and
implements the three thrash rules plus a narrow milestone check
(successful git commit as the last call).
CLIAdapter.RequestHandoffReason asks the agent to write a handoff with
meta.reason set, same "ask, don't invent" pattern as the existing handoff/
report requests. rotate() and TurnDecision generalize the manual-bypass
shortcut to manual/milestone/thrash and request (never directly release)
on a detected trigger.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
Implements §3.1's invariant that a wrong event is never edited, only
compensated for by a new appended event. TaskCorrected references the
event it repairs and can change state and/or amend-style fields;
Store.Append verifies the referenced event actually exists on the task.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
rotate() and TurnDecision now check the agent's own handoff for
meta.reason=="manual" before evaluating occupancy/turn-boundary — per
spec §5.3, that reason is itself the boundary signal ("a coherent unit
finished and the next is independent"), so it bypasses both checks and
releases immediately. Extracted the shared release-and-anchor-certify
tail into Coordinator.finishRelease so the manual path gets the same
anchor safety guarantee as the threshold path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
Coordinator.Soft (default 0.55, ORCHESTRA_OCCUPANCY_SOFT) makes rotate()
and TurnDecision request a handoff advisory-only once occupancy crosses
the soft threshold, well before Hard forces a release/rotation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
Register() previously trusted a self-declared id and self-chosen token
from any caller, and let a second caller silently hijack an existing
worker id by re-registering it with a different token. Adds an optional
pre-shared AdmitToken (ORCHESTRA_FEDERATION_ADMIT_TOKEN) and requires a
same-id re-registration to present the existing worker's own token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
The 1s ticker's own ExpireLeases call almost always won the race against
the coordinator's 30s Monitor loop, so the coordinator's ExpireLeases saw
nothing left to expire and never reached its session-kill path — silently
orphaning herdr panes past their lease TTL whenever a coordinator is
configured. AUDIT.md called this "harmless" on the assumption CAS merely
picked a winner; the real effect is the pane-kill side effect never firing.
Now the ticker defers reclaim entirely to the coordinator when one exists,
keeping only AssignPending as a periodic retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
kami
kami