Files
orchestra/AUDIT.md
T
kami 3fe3aee5b7 fix(herdr): close Phase 4 item 2 — actually ask the agent for a handoff
Release already validated and uploaded a §6.1 handoff, but nothing ever
told the agent the .orchestra-handoff.json convention existed, so the
file it waited on never got written. rotate() now prompts the agent
once via a new optional herdr.HandoffRequester capability
(CLIAdapter.RequestHandoff) when the file is missing, and defers
Release until it appears, mirroring the .orchestra-report.md/B3 ask
pattern rather than inventing a handoff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W1rkJ2hBMybnJctPbcy4tT
2026-07-27 22:10:22 +04:00

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# Orchestra — spec conformance audit & remediation plan
Audited 2026-07-27 against `orchestra-spec (1).md` at commit `325c684`.
Method: read every non-test file in `internal/` and `cmd/`, traced each spec
section to its call site, and checked whether the live path (`main.go`
router → coordinator → adapter) actually reaches it.
---
## Verdict
The substrate (Layer 1) is genuinely built. Layers 24 are **shaped** but not
**wired**: the packages exist, have tests, and compile — but the code paths
that would make an unattended run work are either dead, mis-keyed, or built
against herdr methods that appear to be invented.
Concretely: **a task can be created, routed, and leased. It can never
complete, and it can never rotate.** After 3 lease expiries the router marks
it `TaskFailed`. That is the whole of "connection works but features are
underdeveloped."
`progress.md` overstates completion in several places (see §Corrections).
| Spec layer | State |
|---|---|
| L1 substrate (§3, §4) | Built and correct in the main path. Some defects (below), no missing mechanism. |
| L2 harness (§5) | **Not functional.** Occupancy broken, rotation unreachable, adapter protocol unverified. |
| L3 continuity (§6) | **Dead code.** Handoff schema, pickup validation, scratch branches, TASK.md — none reached from the live path. |
| L4 surfaces (§7) | Partial. Brief/standup/delivery exist; quota projection has no producer; authz has a bypass. |
---
## Blocking defects — in dependency order
### B1. Occupancy is measured from the wrong value (§5.2.1)
`herdr/adapter.go:191`
```go
u, e := a.Usage(s.PaneID) // ClaudeUsage(path string) wants a transcript file
```
`ClaudeUsage`/`CodexUsage`/`OpenCodeUsage` all take a **filesystem path** to
session state. They are handed a **herdr pane ID**. Every call returns
`open <pane-id>: no such file`, so `Coordinator.rotate` hits
`if err != nil { continue }` on line 430 and never rotates anything.
The spec is unusually explicit here — §5.2.1: *"Build this measurement and
verify it against a live session **before** wiring any trigger — the whole
rotation system rests on this number."* That step was skipped, and the
verification gap is exactly where the bug is.
Compounding: `CodexActiveUsage` (the discovery function that resolves the
active rollout via `state_*.sqlite`) and `ClaudeStopHookUsage` and
`OpenCodeStatus` are written but **called from nowhere** outside tests.
### B2. The adapter lookup key is wrong in three of four call sites (§5.3, §5.4)
`AdapterFactory.Herdrs` is keyed by **herdr instance id** (`homesrv-claude`).
`Session.Harness` is set by `CLIAdapter.Lease` to the **harness kind**
(`claude`). Then:
| Call site | Key used | Resolves? |
|---|---|---|
| `refreshSessionHealth` (orchestrator.go:221) | `HerdrID`, falls back to lease | yes |
| `Reconcile` (:291) | `session.Harness` | **no** |
| `expire` (:376, :397) | `session.Harness` | **no** |
| `rotate` (:419) | `session.Harness` | **no** |
So: orphaned panes are never killed on restart, `pane.exited` fast-path never
fires, expired leases never kill their pane, and rotation exits before it
begins. All silently — every one is a bare `continue`.
### B3. Nothing emits `TaskCompleted` (§4, §5.2)
Grep for producers: there is exactly one, `POST /v1/tasks/{id}/complete`,
which a human has to call. The spec assigns this to the **stop-hook/wrapper**
("the plane emits events, not the agent" — Invariant 2). There is no stop
hook, no wrapper, no completion detection of any kind.
Consequence: an agent that finishes its work sits idle until the 30-minute
lease TTL expires → `TaskReleased` → re-leased → repeat → `TaskFailed` at
attempt 3. Unattended runtime, the one metric in §0, is currently bounded at
90 minutes per task and always ends in a false failure.
### B4. The router counts rotation as a retry (§5.3, §5.4)
`router.go:127` increments `attempts[TaskID]` on **every** `TaskReleased`,
and `:169` increments again on every lease. `:149` fails the task at
`MaxAttempts` (3, from `main.go:64`).
Rotation *is* `TaskReleased` (§5.3: "rotation = intra-task lease transfer").
So a task healthy enough to rotate twice is killed by the retry limit. The
spec's retry policy is for *failures* (§5.4), not lease transfers. These need
separate counters — `attempts` should only advance on expiry/crash releases,
never on a release carrying a valid `handoff_ref`.
### B5. Herdr protocol methods are unverified and at least partly invented
`adapter.go` calls `pane.release`, `pane.kill`, `pane.rotation_signal`,
`pane.read`, `agent.get`, `agent.start`, `worktree.create/open`,
`agent.prompt`. The file itself documents that a previous method
(`pane.status`) *was not a valid protocol method* — so this surface has a
history of being written against an imagined API.
`pane.rotation_signal` is near-certainly not real: herdr is a generic
multiplexer with no concept of Orchestra rotation. And `pane.release`
returning a `handoff_ref` is architecturally wrong regardless of whether the
method exists — **herdr does not write handoffs; the agent does** (§6.1, the
handoff is a CAS artifact produced under the Face-B stop hook).
Nothing here can be settled from source. It needs `herdr api schema --json`
run against your protocol-17 instance, diffed against every method the
adapter calls.
Related: §5.1 requires `agent.prompt` with **inline `wait`** for bootstrap
injection, because that's what closes the send-into-a-half-rendered-prompt
race. `CLIAdapter.Lease` calls `Prompt(..., wait=0)` — no wait. Only
`Bootstrap` passes one.
### B6. Layer 3 is entirely dead code (§6)
Never called from anything but tests:
`continuity.ValidatePickup`, `ScratchCommit`, `ScratchPush`, `ScratchPull`,
`ScratchSync`, `MarkdownChanges`, `Save`, `Load`, `Encode`, `Decode`.
`VerifyTaskFile` *is* called — but only when `GitWorktrees.TaskFileSHA` is
non-empty, and `main.go:112` constructs the worktrees **without ever setting
it**. Nothing writes a `TASK.md` into a worktree in the first place.
So the entire §6.2 pickup contract — the part the spec calls
"the make-or-break" and "the defense against the telephone game" — does not
execute. Rotation, if B1/B2 were fixed, would hand the next agent a
`handoff_ref` that was never schema-validated, never anchor-checked, and
never accompanied by an immutable spec.
### B7. Quota projection has no producer (§7.2)
`QuotaAvailability.sumSince` folds `QuotaReported` events. `AggregateQuota`
does the same for the brief. **No code appends a `QuotaReported` event.**
Your config sets `quota_limit_5h: 50` / `quota_limit_weekly: 500` on all six
herdrs; those limits are compared against a permanent 0. The availability
filter is a no-op and the brief's `quota_consumed` is always `{}`.
### B8. `Surface: system` is an unauthenticated full-control bypass (§7.1)
`authz.CapabilityFor` grants `System``FullControl`. `authz.HTTP` reads the
surface straight from the `X-Orchestra-Surface` header, and the token map in
`main.go:760` has **no entry for `system`** — so `tokens[System]` is `""` and
the token check is skipped entirely. Any request on the LAN with
`X-Orchestra-Surface: system` can emit any event on any task.
The surface is also absent from `ParseSurface`'s intent: `System` is supposed
to mean "the plane itself, in-process", but it's reachable over HTTP. It
should never be accepted from a request header.
(Also: unset `ORCHESTRA_*_TOKEN` means that surface is unauthenticated; your
`.orchestra-config/orchestra.env` sets none of them. Defensible on WireGuard,
worth a deliberate decision rather than an accident.)
---
## Secondary defects
| # | Where | Issue |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | `operations.go:16,25` | `go vet` fails: `Brief.From/To` both serialize as `"from"`; `GitSync.Branch/Head/Status` all as `"branch"`. The brief's git state is unreadable by any client. |
| S2 | `main.go:238` | Brief's git state is read from `ORCHESTRA_DATA` (the event-log dir), not from the project worktrees. §7.4 wants "what pushed, what's on which branch, what workpc still needs to pull" — per project. |
| S3 | `operations.BuildBrief` | Counts completions but never surfaces `report_ref`/`receipt`, which §7.4 names as the proofs the brief exists to carry. |
| S4 | `delivery.Fanout.Run:110` | A single send error `return`s and permanently kills the notification goroutine — silently, since `main.go:729` only logs. One ntfy hiccup at 2am = no notifications for the rest of the night. Cursor is also in-memory, so a restart re-notifies the entire log from seq 0. |
| S5 | `store.Lease:341`, `ExpireLeases:350` | `Event.ID` is set to the **task id**, so event IDs collide across every lease of a task. `ApplyAdvisory` and any future ID-based lookup are unsound. |
| S6 | `store.Append:191` | Ingest dedup returns `nil` (success) without appending; `main.go:175` then returns `s.Events(0)[len-1]` — an unrelated event — with `201 Created`. |
| S7 | `store.apply:154` | `TaskAmended` applies only `title`. §4 lists title, due, description, `inherent_priority`. Amendments to the others are accepted, logged, and silently ignored by the projection. |
| S8 | §3.1 | No compensation-event mechanism exists. Append-only holds, but the spec's *correction* path ("a compensating event is appended") has no implementation. |
| S9 | `main.go:482` | Two independent lease-expiry loops (`main.go` 1s ticker and `Coordinator.expire` 30s) race on the same reclaim. Harmless today only because version CAS rejects the loser. |
| S10 | federation | `federation.Registry.Register` accepts a self-declared `id` + self-chosen `token` from any caller — registration is admission-control-free. |
| S11 | §5.3 | Thrash detection, the soft ~55% threshold, milestone rotation, and agent-initiated `ROTATE` are all absent. Only the hard threshold exists, and it's unreachable (B1). |
---
## The architectural fork — decided 2026-07-27
There are **two incompatible federation designs** in the tree, and only one is
deployed.
### Design A — "drive the remote socket" (deployed)
`clients/herdr-bridge.go` runs on workpc and proxies its local herdr Unix
socket to `192.168.1.105:9245`. `.orchestra-config/config.jsonc` registers
`workpc-claude` / `workpc-codex` / `workpc-opencode` against that machine, so
the **homesrv** coordinator resolves a workpc herdr as a candidate and calls
`worktree.create`, `agent.start`, `agent.prompt` on it over TCP as if it were
local. workpc is a dumb pane host; all orchestration logic and all state live
on homesrv, and live state crosses the machine boundary continuously.
### Design B — "workers pull tasks" (`/v1/federation/*`, unused)
workpc would run its own Orchestra process that registers itself
(`POST /v1/federation/workers`), heartbeats, polls the event log with a cursor
(`GET /v1/federation/events` + `/ack`), claims its own lease
(`POST .../claim`), runs a **local** coordinator against its **local** herdr
socket, and reports a handoff carrying an `anchor_sha` it computed from its
own checkout (`POST .../handoff`). homesrv stays authoritative for the log;
nothing but git and validated artifacts crosses the wire.
This is what the spec describes — §2.1: *"Everything crossing a machine
boundary is git + a validated artifact — never live state over the wire."*
**It is fully written on the server side and has zero clients.** There is no
worker binary in this repo; every one of those endpoints is unreachable in
the current deployment.
### Why keeping both is harmful, not merely untidy
Design A breaks a specific correctness property Design B was written to hold.
**The anchor is validated on the wrong machine.** `Coordinator.rotate`
(orchestrator.go:460) calls `herdr.HeadSHA(session.Worktree)`, which shells
out to `git -C <path> rev-parse HEAD`. The coordinator runs on homesrv;
`session.Worktree` is a path on **workpc**. Two outcomes, both bad:
- the path doesn't exist on homesrv → `HeadSHA` errors → rotation silently
skips forever (another bare `continue`); or
- the path *does* exist on homesrv — likely, since every project shares the
`/var/lib/orchestra/worktrees/<project>/<task>` layout — → it returns
**homesrv's HEAD for an unrelated checkout**, and the emitted `TaskReleased`
certifies a commit the agent never worked on.
The second is the dangerous one: it passes validation, looks correct, and
hands the successor an anchor describing another repo's state. That is exactly
the failure §9 item 8 names — *"worktree/anchor validation when a lease's git
checkout lives on a different host than the router"* — against the
degrade-safe default the spec already supplies: *"validate against the local
checkout wherever the harness runs."* Design B satisfies this by construction;
Design A cannot satisfy it without moving validation out of the coordinator.
The same class of bug applies to per-host quota accounting (§9 item 8) and to
`cleanupCompleted`, which runs `git worktree remove` on homesrv for a worktree
that lives on workpc.
### Latent defects in the unused half
Never surfaced because nothing exercises them:
- **Offline detection only runs inside `Snapshot()`** (federation.go:103-118),
called solely from `GET /v1/federation/workers`. Nothing polls it, so
`OnOffline` — the hook at `main.go:131` that releases leases held by a
vanished worker — fires only if a human hits that endpoint. The TTL backstop
§5.4 relies on does not tick on its own.
- **The registry is in-memory with no persistence.** Every restart forgets all
workers and their cursors; a reconnecting worker re-reads the entire log
from seq 0.
### Decision
**Keep Design A through Phase 5; commit to Design B in Phase 6.** Phases 14
(occupancy, Face B, rotation, continuity) are single-host concerns, provable
on homesrv alone with workpc's herdr as just another pane host. Resolving the
federation question first would block the fixes that actually unblock
unattended runtime.
Two guardrails land **immediately**, so Design A cannot corrupt state in the
meantime:
1. Anchor computation happens where the checkout is. Under the bridge that
means having herdr run the `rev-parse` in the pane's worktree rather than
shelling out locally — or, if the protocol schema won't support it,
**refusing to rotate any lease held by a non-local herdr** until Phase 6. A
loud refusal beats a false anchor.
2. Same treatment for `cleanupCompleted`'s `git worktree remove`.
Phase 6 then builds the worker binary against the endpoints that already
exist, adds server-issued tokens (S10), persists the registry, and drives
offline detection from a ticker rather than a request handler.
What is explicitly **not** acceptable is leaving both designs in place
unmarked. If the worker binary is ever abandoned, delete `/v1/federation/*`
and record the deviation — as it stands the repo reads as though the
spec-conformant path is implemented when nothing can reach it.
---
## Remediation plan
Ordered so each phase is verifiable on its own and nothing depends on an
unproven layer below it — the spec's own build discipline (§8).
### Phase 0 — Ground truth (half a day, blocks everything)
Nothing below is safe to write until the herdr surface is known.
1. On workpc: `herdr api schema --json > herdr-schema.json`, commit it to
`deploy/`.
2. Write `internal/herdr/schema_test.go`: for every method string in
`adapter.go`, assert it exists in the committed schema with the params we
send. This is the test that would have caught `pane.status` and will catch
the next one.
3. Manually drive one pane end to end against real herdr — create worktree,
start agent, prompt with inline wait, read status, kill — and record the
actual request/response shapes. Fix `adapter.go` to match.
4. Delete `pane.rotation_signal` and the `RotationSignal` interface unless the
schema proves it exists.
**Done when:** `schema_test.go` passes against the committed schema, and a
scripted manual run starts and stops a real Claude Code pane on workpc.
### Phase 1 — Occupancy, measured for real (§5.2.1) — fixes B1
The spec says build this first and verify against a live session. Do exactly
that, and nothing else in this phase.
1. Add `SessionFile string` to `herdr.Session`. Resolve it at lease time, per
harness:
- **claude** — the transcript path. Cleanest source is the Stop hook's
stdin (`transcript_path`), which you need for Phase 2 anyway; until then
resolve `~/.claude/projects/<enc-worktree-path>/<session>.jsonl` by
newest-mtime under the encoded worktree dir.
- **codex** — `CodexActiveUsage` already does the `state_*.sqlite →
threads.rollout_path` discovery. Call it. Filter by the rollout whose cwd
matches the worktree.
- **opencode** — `OpenCodeStatus` against `:4096` as fast path,
`~/.local/share/opencode/storage/message/` as backstop, per §5.2.1's
"the SSE stream is not rock-solid".
2. Change `CLIAdapter.Occupancy` to use `s.SessionFile`, and make a missing
session file a **hard error surfaced in `MonitorHealth`**, never a silent
`continue`.
3. Keep the §5.2.1 trap explicit: assert in a test that a fixture with a large
cumulative total but small last-turn usage yields *low* occupancy. This is
the failure mode the spec singles out.
4. Add `GET /v1/tasks/{id}/occupancy` returning the raw numerator, the window,
and the fraction — so you can eyeball it against a live session before
trusting it to drive rotation.
**Done when:** a real Claude Code session at a known context fill reports a
fraction within a few points of what `/context` says.
### Phase 2 — Face B and completion (§5.2, §4) — fixes B3, B5
1. **Claude Code Stop hook** (`deploy/hooks/orchestra-stop.sh`, bash, no
deps — §5.6). Reads hook JSON on stdin, POSTs `transcript_path` + task id
to a new `POST /v1/harness/turn` endpoint. Exit 2 with stderr when the
plane says "rotate but no valid handoff yet" — that's the spec's refuse-the-
turn mechanism, and `ClaudeStopHookUsage` already parses the input shape.
2. `POST /v1/harness/turn` computes occupancy, evaluates the rotation triggers,
and returns a decision: `continue` | `prepare_handoff` (soft) |
`rotate_now` (hard) | `refuse` (over threshold, handoff missing/invalid).
3. **Completion**: `POST /v1/harness/complete` — the wrapper/hook path that
uploads the report to CAS and emits `TaskCompleted` with `report_ref` +
`receipt`. Wire the receipt from Phase 1's occupancy reader, **summed
across lease intervals** per §4.
4. Codex/opencode Face B: rollout-tail and SSE `session.status` respectively,
polled by the coordinator rather than hook-pushed. Same decision endpoint.
**Done when:** a task given a trivial goal on a real harness reaches
`TaskCompleted` with a `report_ref` resolvable from CAS, with no human action.
### Phase 3 — Make rotation reachable and correct (§5.3, §5.4) — fixes B2, B4
1. Key sessions by `HerdrID` everywhere. Add a single
`Coordinator.adapterFor(session) (herdr.Adapter, error)` and route all four
call sites through it. Add a regression test that registers an adapter
under `homesrv-claude`, leases with `Harness: "claude"`, and asserts
rotation still fires.
2. Replace every silent `continue` in `rotate`/`expire` with a recorded reason
on `MonitorHealth`. The class of bug in B1/B2 is only invisible because of
those bare continues.
3. Split the router's counters: `releases` (informational) vs `failures`
(drives `MaxAttempts`). A `TaskReleased` carrying a valid `handoff_ref`
must not advance `failures`. Test: a task that rotates 5 times is still
alive.
4. Implement the missing triggers (§5.3): soft 55% → `prepare_handoff`;
milestone; thrash (N failed test runs / same file M times / identical tool
calls) as a circuit breaker with `reason=thrash` and populated `dead_ends`;
agent-initiated `ROTATE`.
5. Make TTL and the retry policy config, not the hardcoded `30*time.Minute` at
`router.go:165` and `1800` in `main.go` (§5.4: "N, ttl, retry backoff =
config").
6. **Land the two Design-A guardrails** (see the federation decision above):
compute the anchor where the checkout is, or refuse to rotate a lease held
by a non-local herdr; same for `cleanupCompleted`'s worktree removal. These
are the fixes that make it safe to defer federation to Phase 6.
**Done when:** a long-running task crosses 75% occupancy, rotates at a turn
boundary, and the successor continues — twice in a row, unattended.
### Phase 4 — Wire Layer 3 into the live path (§6) — fixes B6
This is where the dead code becomes load-bearing.
1. **Write `TASK.md`** into the worktree at creation from the `TaskCreated`
payload; hash it; store the hash on the task; pass it as `TaskFileSHA` into
`PerProjectGitWorktrees` (`main.go:112`). Re-inject it on every rotation
bootstrap — §6.2 is explicit that this is what defeats the telephone game.
2. **Handoff production**: the rotating agent writes the §6.1 TOML/JSON
handoff; the stop hook uploads it via `POST /v1/artifacts`; the plane
`continuity.Decode`s it, rejecting free-form `[knowledge]` (Invariant 4),
and only then emits `TaskReleased` with the hash. Never accept a
`handoff_ref` the plane hasn't validated.
3. **Scratch-branch commit before release** (`ScratchCommit`), so §6.2 step 3
collapses to one sha compare. `ScratchCommit` already refuses to commit a
dirty `TASK.md` — good, keep that.
4. **Pickup**: `ValidatePickup` runs in `Coordinator.Start` before the
successor's bootstrap prompt. Fail → do not start; emit `TaskBlocked`.
5. Replace `CLIAdapter.Bootstrap`'s freeform prose with the §6.2 procedure
(~200 tokens: read handoff, run validate-handoff, re-read TASK.md,
proceed), and use `agent.prompt`'s inline wait.
6. Wire `MarkdownChanges` to the §6.3 adjacent-task notice, or delete it and
record the deferral. Dead code that looks implemented is what produced this
audit.
**Done when:** a rotation whose anchor has drifted is *refused*, visibly, and
one whose anchor is clean proceeds without the successor re-deriving context.
### Phase 5 — Close the surfaces (§7) — fixes B7, B8, S1S4
1. Emit `QuotaReported`. Source: the same per-harness session state as
Phase 1, on a timer per `harness+window` (§7.2 — "a projection keyed by
`harness+window`, fed by the same per-harness session state"). Until then,
your quota limits are decorative.
2. Reject `X-Orchestra-Surface: system` at the HTTP boundary unconditionally.
`System` must be constructible in-process only. Then decide explicitly
whether the remaining surfaces require tokens on your LAN, and set them.
3. Fix the `go vet` json-tag collisions (S1) — the brief is currently
unparseable for git state.
4. Brief: per-project git sync state from the actual worktrees (S2), and
include `report_ref`/`receipt` in the rollup (S3).
5. Delivery: never `return` on send error — log, back off, continue. Persist
the cursor next to the event log (S4). Deliver the morning brief itself.
**Done when:** `/v1/brief` for an overnight window shows real quota per
harness, real per-project git state, and the receipts for every completion.
### Phase 6 — Federation, decided (§2.1, §9 item 8) — fixes the fork, S10
Only after Phases 15 run clean on a single host.
1. Anchor validation and `HeadSHA` execute **where the checkout is**. Today
they run on homesrv against a workpc path.
2. Either build the worker binary against `/v1/federation/*` (git-only
transport, per spec) or delete that API and document the bridge as a
deliberate deviation. Do not keep both.
3. Add admission control to worker registration (S10): server-issued tokens,
not self-declared.
4. Then run the real two-machine overnight batch that §9 item 8 asks for.
---
## Corrections to `progress.md`
Worth fixing, because the next session will otherwise trust it:
- "Continuity: strict handoff schema/validation, CAS save/load, pickup
validation, scratch-branch commit/push/pull helpers" — accurate as a
description of the *package*, misleading as a description of the *system*.
None of it is reachable at runtime.
- "herdr adapters with native occupancy readers" — the readers exist; they are
called with the wrong argument and always fail.
- "Router: ... quota availability at conservative 80% threshold" — the
threshold logic is correct, but no `QuotaReported` event is ever produced,
so it evaluates against zero.
- The rotation fix described in "Verified fixed this pass" is real and
correct — but `rotate` cannot reach that code, because the adapter lookup
above it (B2) fails first. The test passes because it registers the adapter
under the harness kind rather than the herdr id, which the production
config never does.
- "`go build ./...` and `go test ./...` both pass" — true; `go vet ./...`
does not.
---
## Suggested order of attack
If you want one thing to do today: **Phase 0**, then **B2** (a ~20-line fix
that makes three subsystems reachable), then **B1**. Those three turn a system
that cannot rotate into one that can, and everything else in the plan is
building on top rather than repairing underneath.
---
## Phase 0 — done, 2026-07-27
B1, B2, B4, B8, S1, S5, S6 were already fixed and landed as of this session
(confirmed by reading the current code, not just trusting progress.md — see
`adapterFor` in `internal/orchestrator/orchestrator.go:190` and
`CLIAdapter.Occupancy` in `internal/herdr/adapter.go:197`).
This box (homesrv) turned out to have live TCP reachability to the real herdr
instance at `192.168.1.105:9245` (workpc) the whole time — the `unavailable:
connection refused` lines in `journalctl -u orchestra.service` are for
`homesrv-*` herdrs dialing `192.168.1.104:9245`, which has no local herdr
running; `workpc-*` herdrs were connecting fine but main.go never logs a
success, only a failure, so there was no positive signal either way. Also
found: **a real task is stuck live right now** — workspace `wA`, task
`06FT6CKD9Y98AZRX6X8K3QXFZG`, opencode agent, pane `wA:p1`, `agent_status:
"blocked"` — almost certainly stuck because `Release`/rotation could never
reach it (see below).
Ran the actual Phase 0 steps against this live instance (raw JSON-RPC probes
over TCP, params-omitted/empty-object tricks to read Rust serde's
missing-field errors — no `herdr` CLI available locally, so `herdr api schema
--json` itself wasn't run, but the equivalent info was extracted this way).
Full method list and findings committed to `deploy/herdr-schema.json`.
**Confirmed, with a real server response, not just static reading of
adapter.go:**
- `pane.release`, `pane.kill`, `pane.rotation_signal` — **none of these exist**
in the real protocol. Confirms B5's suspicion exactly.
- Real replacement for `pane.kill` is `pane.close({pane_id})` — same shape,
drop-in. **Fixed** in `internal/herdr/adapter.go`.
- Real replacement for `pane.release` is `pane.release_agent({pane_id,
source, agent})` — structurally different, and per B5's own analysis it
cannot return a `handoff_ref` regardless (herdr doesn't write handoffs, the
agent does, §6.1). Wiring this for real needs Phase 4's handoff-production
path first. `CLIAdapter.Release` now returns a loud error naming exactly
that instead of calling a method that doesn't exist. **Not a full fix** —
Phase 4 still owns making Release do something real.
- `pane.rotation_signal` doesn't exist and never will (herdr has no rotation
concept) — deleted `RotationSignal` interface, its `CLIAdapter` method, and
the call site in `Coordinator.rotate`, per this doc's own instruction
("Delete ... unless the schema proves it exists").
- `agent.get`, `pane.read`, `agent.prompt`, `worktree.create`, `worktree.open`,
`agent.start` — all confirmed real, no changes needed there.
- Protocol version confirmed live: `17`, matching `config.jsonc`'s
`"protocol": "17"` (returned as a bare JSON number by the server; the
existing string-fallback parse in `CheckProtocol` happens to handle that
correctly already).
`go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...` all pass after these
changes.
## B3 — partial fix, 2026-07-27
Added `POST /v1/harness/complete` (`cmd/orchestra/main.go`) — the first
automatic `TaskCompleted` producer. Design: a Claude Code Stop hook
(`deploy/hooks/orchestra-stop.sh`) runs on every turn boundary but only POSTs
when the agent has written `.orchestra-report.md` at the worktree root —
that file is the explicit "I'm done" signal, since Stop fires on every pause
and treating every stop as completion would be wrong (this is exactly the
distinction Phase 2 items 12, the `continue`/`prepare_handoff`/`rotate_now`/
`refuse` turn-decision endpoint, are meant to own — that endpoint is still
unbuilt, so there is currently no plane-side signal telling the agent when to
rotate vs. finish; the marker-file convention is a stopgap that only covers
the completion half).
The handler builds the `receipt` server-side from `herdr.ClaudeUsage` against
the transcript path the hook supplies (same local-filesystem assumption as
`CLIAdapter.Occupancy` — doesn't hold for a session hosted on a herdr that
isn't local to the machine running orchestra, i.e. the federation-fork
caveat applies here too) rather than trusting a self-reported number, and
uploads the report body via `Store.PutArtifact` for `report_ref`. Event is
appended with `Surface: string(authz.System)` hardcoded in Go — not read from
a request header — consistent with B8 (system must never be
header-controlled); gated instead by an optional `ORCHESTRA_HARNESS_TOKEN`
bearer check.
**Not done:** Codex/opencode completion producers (only Claude wired), the
turn-decision endpoint itself, and no test — `cmd/orchestra/main.go` has zero
handler test coverage of any kind (everything is inline in `main()`), so this
follows the existing gap rather than introducing an isolated test harness for
one handler.
**Fixed 2026-07-27 (later same day):** `CLIAdapter.Lease`'s bootstrap prompt now
passes `time.Minute` instead of `wait=0`, matching `Bootstrap`'s inline-wait
pattern — closes the race B5 named (send-into-a-half-rendered-prompt).
`internal/herdr/adapter.go`. `go build`/`vet`/`test` all still pass; no
existing test asserted the old `wait=0` value.
**Still open from B5** (not attempted this pass — larger, needs design, not
just a method-name swap):
- `Release`'s real implementation, which depends on Phase 4 (§6) handoff
production existing at all.
- The stuck live task (`06FT6CKD9Y98AZRX6X8K3QXFZG`) was deliberately **not**
manipulated directly (no `pane.close`/`pane.release_agent` call against it)
— killing or releasing a real running agent from an audit session without
the user present is exactly the kind of action that warrants asking first.
## B5 — closed, 2026-07-27 (later same day)
`CLIAdapter.Release` now does something real instead of refusing. Design
mirrors the `.orchestra-report.md` marker convention B3 already established
for completion, since the same problem applies to handoffs: the plane must
never invent a handoff, only validate and forward the one the agent wrote
(§6.1). Concretely:
1. The agent is expected to write `.orchestra-handoff.json`
(`herdr.HandoffFile`) at the worktree root before its stop hook lets
rotation proceed — a §6.1 handoff schema, not free prose.
2. `Release` reads that file, decodes it with `continuity.Decode` (schema +
required-field validation, same as pickup), and cross-checks
`Anchor.GitSHA` against `herdr.HeadSHA(session.Worktree)` — the anchor is
re-verified against the real checkout, not trusted from the agent's
self-report, closing the same class of gap as B3's receipt-from-transcript
choice.
3. Only if both checks pass does it upload the handoff via `continuity.Save`
(`CLIAdapter.CAS`, wired to the same `*store.Store` used everywhere else)
and return the resulting ref — this is what `Coordinator.rotate` puts in
`TaskReleased.handoff_ref`.
4. Only *then* does it call the real `pane.release_agent({pane_id, source:
"herdr:"+harness, agent: harness})` to drop herdr's claim — sequenced last
so a herdr-side failure can't strand an already-uploaded handoff with no
way to retry the release call (retrying `Release` re-reads the same file
and is idempotent).
A missing or invalid handoff file, an anchor mismatch, or a `pane.release_agent`
error are all refused (non-nil error, no event emitted) — `Coordinator.rotate`
already treats an errored `Release` as "leave the lease intact, retry next
tick," so this gives the agent room to finish writing the handoff rather than
stranding the task.
`herdr.Claude`/`Codex`/`OpenCode` constructors now take a `continuity.CAS`
parameter; `cmd/orchestra/main.go` passes the existing `*store.Store` (which
already implements `PutArtifact`/`Artifact`).
New tests in `internal/herdr/adapter_test.go` drive `Release` against a real
git worktree and a fake in-process herdr TCP listener (`fakeHerdr`) responding
to `pane.release_agent`: upload-and-release on a valid handoff, refusal with
no handoff file, refusal on anchor mismatch, refusal with no CAS configured.
**Still not done** (unchanged, separate from B5 itself): nothing yet makes
the *agent* actually write `.orchestra-handoff.json` — that's Phase 4 item 2's
other half (a stop-hook-side convention, analogous to
`.orchestra-report.md`/`deploy/hooks/orchestra-stop.sh` for completion) and
Phase 4 items 3/5/6 (`ScratchCommit` before release, the §6.2 bootstrap-prompt
rewrite, `MarkdownChanges` wiring). `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, and
`go test ./...` all still pass.
## B6 — partial fix, 2026-07-27 (Phase 4 items 1 and 4)
Two of Phase 4's six items landed; the rest are unchanged (still open, listed
below).
1. **TASK.md is now actually written.** `continuity.RenderTaskFile(t)`
produces the §6.2 immutable spec content from `domain.Task`;
`GitWorktrees.Create` (`internal/orchestrator/orchestrator.go`) writes it
into every freshly created worktree and commits it immediately — it must
be committed, not left dirty, both so `ScratchCommit`'s "TASK.md is
immutable" check (which inspects `git status`) sees it as clean, and so
its hash is stable across whatever the agent does afterward. A worktree
that already has a `TASK.md` (recreation on restart) is left untouched.
New `continuity.TaskFileHash(root)` reads it back and hashes it — this is
what makes `w.TaskFileSHA`/`VerifyTaskFile`, previously dead because
nothing ever set `TaskFileSHA`, actually reachable.
2. **Pickup validation now gates bootstrap.** `Coordinator.Start`
(`internal/orchestrator/orchestrator.go`) computes the new worktree's
`TaskFileHash`, and — whenever the lease carries a `handoff_ref` (i.e.
this is a rotation continuation, not a fresh lease) — loads the handoff
from CAS and runs `continuity.ValidatePickup(worktree, handoff,
taskFileSHA)` **before** calling `Adapter.Bootstrap`. A validation failure
kills the just-started session and emits `TaskBlocked` instead of hand­ing
the successor an unverified anchor. This is exactly the gap B6 named:
`ValidatePickup` had no caller outside its own tests.
`TestStartBlocksOnInvalidPickup` (`rotation_test.go`) drives this against
a handoff whose anchor SHA doesn't exist in the repo and asserts the task
ends `Blocked`, never bootstrapped.
`TestGitWorktreesCommitsTaskFile` (`worktrees_test.go`) asserts the
written/committed content matches `RenderTaskFile` and survives
recreation.
Caveat recorded in code: TASK.md hashing is best-effort — if a worktree came
from the `WorktreeCreator` (herdr-hosted, potentially remote) path rather
than `GitWorktrees`, `TaskFileHash` fails silently and pickup validation runs
with an empty `taskFileSHA` (so it still checks anchor SHA and dirty-file
hashes, just not TASK.md). No current adapter or test exercises
`WorktreeCreator` with a real `handoff_ref`, so this is unverified, not
proven safe — same cross-host caveat as the federation-fork section.
**Still open from B6/Phase 4** (unchanged, larger and needs live-agent
cooperation):
- Item 2: handoff *production* — the rotating agent writing the §6.1
handoff and a stop-hook path uploading it via `POST /v1/artifacts` before
`Coordinator.rotate` calls `Adapter.Release`. `Release` still just refuses
(see B5 above) — there is nothing yet to validate-and-mint a ref from.
## Phase 4 items 3, 5, 6 — landed 2026-07-27
1. **`ScratchCommit` wired into `Release`, not into `rotate`.** Rather than
calling it from `Coordinator.rotate` (which only has a `herdr.Session`,
not the handoff), `CLIAdapter.Release` now runs it itself, after
validating the agent-authored handoff's `Anchor.GitSHA` against the
worktree's real HEAD and re-verifying every `Anchor.Dirty` file's hash
still matches what the agent recorded (previously untested — a file
edited *after* the handoff was written but before release would have
silently sailed through). If the handoff has dirty entries, `Release`
commits them atomically onto `orchestra/scratch/<handoff-meta-id>` via
`continuity.ScratchCommit`, then **rewrites the handoff's anchor** to the
new scratch commit SHA with `Dirty` cleared, before uploading to CAS —
this is what "collapses §6.2 step 3 to one sha compare" means in
practice: the successor's `ValidatePickup` now only needs
`git rev-parse HEAD == handoff.anchor.git_sha`, no per-file rehashing,
because everything was committed before the ref was minted.
`ScratchCommit` itself was changed to be idempotent — reuse an existing
scratch branch (`git switch` before falling back to `git switch -c`) and
skip the commit if there's nothing to snapshot — since a task can rotate,
and therefore hit this path, more than once.
Covered by `TestReleaseScratchCommitsDirtyFilesBeforeUpload` (asserts the
anchor advances to the new commit, dirty is cleared, and the worktree
ends up on the scratch branch) and `TestReleaseRefusesOnStaleDirtyFile`
(internal/herdr/adapter_test.go).
2. **Item 5 — Bootstrap prompt rewritten.** `CLIAdapter.Bootstrap` no longer
sends the one-line "read handoff, validate anchor, continue" prose. It
now tells the agent the plane has *already* validated anchor/TASK.md
(true, per B6's `ValidatePickup` gate in `Coordinator.Start` — no need to
ask the agent to redundantly re-verify trust), and points it at
`git log --stat -5` / `git branch --show-current` in the worktree as the
actual source of "what the prior agent did and what's left," since that's
now a real, inspectable scratch-branch commit rather than an opaque ref.
Deliberately does **not** claim a `GET /v1/artifacts/<ref>` fetch path —
no such HTTP route exists (`/v1/artifacts` is POST-only, upload only,
confirmed by reading `cmd/orchestra/main.go`); an earlier draft of this
prompt invented that endpoint and was corrected before landing, which is
exactly the class of bug this audit exists to catch.
3. **Item 6 — `MarkdownChanges` deleted, not wired.** Confirmed zero
callers anywhere (including its own tests — there were none, despite
being listed as "believed accurate" in a prior progress.md snapshot).
Wiring it for real needs a design for what "adjacent task" means and
where the notice surfaces (brief? a new event type?), which is a real
feature, not a wiring fix — AUDIT.md explicitly allows "delete it and
record the deviation" as the alternative to half-implementing that. Taking
that option rather than bolting on an undesigned notification path.
**Phase 4 item 2 — closed 2026-07-27.** The remaining gap after B5 was not
"which harness" (Release was always harness-agnostic) — it was that *nothing,
for any harness*, ever told the agent the `.orchestra-handoff.json` convention
existed. `Coordinator.rotate` (internal/orchestrator/orchestrator.go) now
checks whether the resolved adapter implements a new optional
`herdr.HandoffRequester` capability; if `HandoffFile` isn't present in the
worktree yet, it calls `RequestHandoff` once (`herdr.Session.HandoffRequested`
guards against re-prompting every tick) and skips `Release` for that tick,
leaving the lease intact — exactly the same "ask, don't invent" shape as B3's
`.orchestra-report.md` convention. `CLIAdapter.RequestHandoff`
(internal/herdr/adapter.go) sends a prompt naming the exact §6.1 JSON shape
(`meta.id`, `anchor.git_sha`/`branch`/`dirty[].{path,sha256}`) and explicitly
tells the agent not to fabricate the SHA/hashes. Once the file exists, the
existing Release path (validate → scratch-commit dirty files → upload → CAS
→ `pane.release_agent`) is unchanged. Covered by
`TestRotationRequestsHandoffBeforeReleasing`
(internal/orchestrator/rotation_test.go), which asserts `Release` is never
called while the file is absent and fires once it's written. `go build`,
`go vet`, `go test ./...` all pass.
Not attempted here (separate, deployment-level question, not a code gap):
whether Codex's/opencode's own turn-boundary mechanism actually surfaces this
in-pane prompt to the agent before it exits the way Claude Code's Stop hook
does — that's Phase 2 item 4 territory (native Face B per harness), not
Phase 4.