The v3 stack, previously an uncommitted working tree, plus this session's two units and the burn-in instrument. This commit is the burn-in build identity: coordinator and worker must both report this revision before a task is created. Workflow (earlier sessions, uncommitted until now): human decision events and reduction, source cursors and reconcile-before-launch, turn-boundary reconciliation, internal/agentctx as the single renderer, ace-fca phases with sealed artifacts, the trajectory gate, bounded grilling, independent review, task pr enforcement, and human review reflection. Capability restrictions at the agent boundary: an authz.Agent surface at GatedWrite may ask and may not act. It also fixes two bugs the unit exposed -- gated surfaces could not reach the two endpoints written for them, and RequestHumanDecision would block an unowned task while rejecting a question from the session that did own it. Turn-boundary reconcile-failure escalation: a streak of consecutive failures asks the session to hand off, fenced on the lease epoch, with reconcile_failure as a real handoff reason. The worker was dropping the coordinator's verdict on the floor; it now acts on it. Burn-in: herdr.WriteLaunchContext dumps the exact agentctx.Build result to <worktree>/.orchestra/launch.md at every launch, local and federated. BURNIN.md is the runbook. deploy/build.sh stamps both binaries from one commit. go build, go vet and go test ./... pass, 20 packages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Burn-in: live conformance, not more architecture
Written 2026-08-26. The workflow is feature-complete enough to exercise. What remains is empirical: run the same real task shape through each harness and classify what breaks. Isolated tests are insufficient by design here, and only the live owner path establishes conformance.
Do not add workflow features while this is running. Findings decide the next implementation work.
Deployment state, probed 2026-08-26
Burn-in cannot start yet. Two blockers, one config gap.
| Fact | Evidence |
|---|---|
| The API is up on homesrv | GET 192.168.1.104:9145/readyz → ready:true, store/router/gitea/jsonl all ready |
| The workpc worker is up and serving two harnesses | orchestra-worker pid 741, restarted 2026-08-26 11:39, no errors since |
| The deployed worker predates every v3 unit | go version -m /usr/local/bin/orchestra-worker → vcs.revision=97a9c65, vcs.time=2026-07-30 |
| The v3 work is uncommitted | Both sessions' units are working-tree changes on webui-and-audit-reconciliation |
| Codex has no harness entry at all | /etc/orchestra/harnesses.json declares only workpc-claude (tmux) and workpc-opencode (herdr) |
| No homesrv worker is running | Only the API container runs there; the three homesrv-* herdrs have no worker |
Consequences:
- Commit, then rebuild and redeploy both artifacts. The API container
(
docker compose -f compose.yaml -f compose.live.yaml up -d --buildin/mnt/server/home/kami/docker-apps/orchestra-web-ui) and the worker binary (staged atworkpc:~/orchestra-deploy/orchestra-worker, then installed to/usr/local/bin, thensystemctl restart orchestra-worker). Confirm the API revision atGET /v1/admin/diagnosticsand the worker's atgo version -m. Neither currently has phases, review, submission, the agent surface, or the reconcile escalation. - Codex cannot be burned in until it has a harnesses.json entry. Three of
four target harnesses are unreachable today: codex is unconfigured, and both
homesrv-claude/homesrv-codex/homesrv-opencodehave no worker. - The registry is misleading about herdr transports. No entry in the live
config.jsoncsetsbackendoraddress, so all six resolve to<machine>:9245(registry.defaultHerdrPort), and both ports are closed. The workpc worker actually uses a tmux socket and a unix socket (/home/kami/.config/herdr/herdr.sock). Federated reachability defers to worker heartbeat, so this does not block leasing, but a TCP probe of 9245 is not evidence about any of these harnesses. Do not diagnose from it.
Evidence to record per run
One row per run. The launch instruction is now dumped to
<worktree>/.orchestra/launch.md (herdr.LaunchContextFile) at every launch,
local and federated, so the context is auditable without reading pane
scrollback.
harness (claude | codex | opencode)
task id
lease epoch (every epoch, if the task rotates)
session ids (pane ids per epoch)
human decision ids
launch context (sha256 of .orchestra/launch.md, per launch)
handoff ref
git sha (at every boundary: launch, each handoff, review, submit, merge)
review ref
submission ref
pr id
completion receipt
The five flows
- Boring success.
task → research → plan → implement → review → pr → merge. - Mid-session correction. Agent is doing A, the human says B, the next verified boundary delivers B, and A becomes history rather than a competing instruction.
- Rotation. Agent A hands off, agent B resumes. Switch harnesses across the boundary if both are up.
- Human rejection. Submit sha A, comment on the pull request, task reopens, fix at sha B, a fresh review, the same pull request, merge.
- Failure path. Human source goes down, the reconcile streak escalates, the session hands off, the successor lease is refused, the source recovers, and a corrected successor starts.
What to inspect by hand
For every launch, read .orchestra/launch.md and ask only:
does this agent know
- what the task actually wants?
- what was most recently decided?
- what phase it is in?
- what earlier material is merely historical?
- what to do next?
Then compare that against what the model did.
Classify before fixing
Every failure gets exactly one label before any code is written:
authority bug the wrong thing outranked the right thing
context-selection bug the renderer showed or hid the wrong material
lifecycle bug state, lease, phase or event handling is wrong
adapter/harness bug the pane, occupancy, boundary or prompt path is wrong
model-following failure the context was right and the model ignored it
operator-policy gap credentials, deployment or configuration
This matters because the cheap response to every failure is another prompt rule, and prompt rules accumulated to compensate for lifecycle or adapter bugs are how the enforcement boundary rots. A model-following failure is the only class a prompt change should ever answer.
Pane credential cleanup (operator, in parallel)
The agent pane inherits the worker's environment. On workpc the worker is
orchestra-worker.service, User=kami, EnvironmentFile=/etc/orchestra/worker.env
(mode 0600, root-owned, deliberately unreadable here). Remove from that file, and
from anything else the pane inherits:
gitea mutation token
vikunja mutation credentials
orchestra operator / system token
Retain only ORCHESTRA_AGENT_TOKEN and credentials a specific task genuinely
needs. If an agent needs a forge operation, it asks Orchestra to perform it.
Then verify from inside a real pane:
git push # must fail unless Orchestra supplied the auth
curl .../v1/tasks/<id>/submission # must be 403 for the agent surface
tea pr create # must have no usable mutation credential
Note what is not enforced by code: nothing in this repo scrubs the pane
environment, and a fake git earlier in $PATH is not enforcement because
/usr/bin/git bypasses it. Credential isolation is the enforcement.
Confinement of network, filesystem and destructive commands belongs to whatever
launches the process (herdr, a container, systemd, bubblewrap), not to
Orchestra, which supplies identity and policy inputs.
Exit criterion
Roughly 10 to 20 real tasks, with the five flows covered on each harness that is actually up. Then read the classified failures and decide the next implementation unit from them.