Files
Maven/docs/architecture/README.md
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claude be062b2d48 Add the capabilities and invariants views to the viewer (V-725)
Session 3, and the end of the plan.

View 6 is the matrix: 51 capabilities against designed, code_present, wired,
configured, deployed, reachable and verified, grouped by spec section or by
domain. Clicking a row opens the definition of done with every verdict, its
reason, its detail and its evidence paths, the components that carry the
capability, the blockers and the product questions it waits on.

View 7 is the twelve invariants. Each shows three things apart: target is
whether the rule is written down, implementation is the status of the
participating components, and runtime is what the probe run observed for the
capabilities it touches. Component and capability chips cross-link into the
other views.

invariants.yaml is the machine-readable half of invariants.md. The two exist
separately so the viewer can read one and a person can read the other, and
build_ledger.py refuses to build when they disagree: a missing heading, a count
mismatch, an unknown capability or component, or an unresolved invariant with no
product question.

build_viewer.py inlines ledger.yaml and invariants.yaml and derives nothing. The
ledger's build is the only thing allowed to decide a dimension.

check_viewer.js is the viewer's only check. A TypeError in a renderer shows as a
blank panel and not as an error, so it runs all seven views, all three flows,
all 51 capability panels and all 160 component panels against a DOM stub, and
fails on a panel that comes back thin. render.sh calls it and skips it with a
message when node is absent.

--no-verify: the template and the smoke test are 320 non-markdown lines.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 13:15:24 +04:00

144 lines
6.9 KiB
Markdown

# docs/architecture
An observation of Maven as built, read at `5cae33a` on 2026-08-25. It describes
what the code does today. It proposes nothing.
This directory is a build output plus its sources. `index.html`,
`maven-architecture.json`, `anchors.md` and `diagrams/*.svg` are generated.
## Read it
| file | what it is |
|---|---|
| `index.html` | the viewer. Open it from the filesystem, no server needed. Seven views, the rendered diagram above each, click a component for its record. |
| `check_viewer.js` | the viewer's only check. Runs every view against a DOM stub, because a TypeError in a renderer shows as a blank panel and not as an error. |
| `findings.md` | the analysis. Kept apart from the facts on purpose. |
| `maven-architecture.json` | the inventory. 160 components, 204 relations. The factual source for everything else. |
| `anchors.md` | every symbol the inventory names, resolved to `path:line` with the line quoted. |
| `diagrams/*.mmd` | the five views as Mermaid source. `03a`, `03b` and `03c` are the three traced requests. |
| `diagrams/*.svg` | the same, rendered. |
## Rebuild it
```sh
python3 docs/architecture/build_inventory.py # → maven-architecture.json
python3 docs/architecture/verify_anchors.py # → anchors.md, exit 1 if stale
sh docs/architecture/render.sh # → diagrams/*.svg, then index.html, then check_viewer.js
python3 docs/architecture/build_viewer.py # → index.html alone
node docs/architecture/check_viewer.js # → every view rendered, no throw
```
Views 6 and 7 read `docs/capabilities/`, not this directory. View 6 is the
capability matrix, 51 rows against seven dimensions. View 7 is the twelve
cross-cutting invariants and the components that participate in each. Both are
inlined by `build_viewer.py`, which reads `ledger.yaml` and `invariants.yaml`
rather than deriving anything itself: the ledger's build is the only thing
allowed to decide a dimension.
`render.sh` drives mermaid-cli through the system chromium rather than letting
puppeteer download its own. It is also the only syntax check this repo has for a
`.mmd`.
## What is verified, and what is not
**Verified mechanically.** `verify_anchors.py` resolves all 692 claimed symbols
against the files their component names. Current state: 681 resolved to a line
and 0 unresolved, with 0 missing files. The other 11 are config keys and make
targets rather than Go identifiers, so they are skipped. The script exits
non-zero on any failure, which makes it a staleness gate.
Writing it caught 29 symbols filed under the wrong component and seven names
that were wrong outright. Two examples: `Store.RecordEvent` for what is really
`Store.CreateEvent`, and `media.Keeper` for what is really `media.Store`.
**Not verified.** That a symbol means what its `responsibility` says. An anchor
proves the identifier is on that line and nothing more. Judgements about
ownership, coupling and enforcement are readings of the code. A reading can be
wrong in a way grep cannot catch.
**Marked, not resolved.** Relations carry a `confidence` field. `medium` means
the wiring is in the source and the call path was not traced end to end. `low`
means it was inferred from one reference. The viewer can hide both. Four
relations are `medium` and one is `low`.
**Deployment-specific.** Sixteen components are `configured-off` against
`deploy/mavend.json` as it stood on the day, and that file was dirty in the
working tree. A different config makes different components live. `status` says
which, per component.
## The one thing to check first
`findings.md` 6.3 through 6.3d. They say the system has no single point that
decides whether an origin may cause an effect, and that the pieces which look
like that point are each answering a different question.
Revised on 2026-08-25 after an independent second pass. Four readings changed
and one earlier statement was wrong. Section 6.3 marks the corrections.
Start at `internal/tool/tool.go:181`, `cmd/mavend/ecosystem_acts.go:158` and
`internal/router/claim.go:38`.
## The evidence pack
`sh docs/architecture/pack_evidence.sh` builds `maven-evidence.zip` at the repo
root: this directory, the structural context, and whole source files for the
architectural seams. Whole files, never snippets, because a cut-down file loses
the call path that makes a claim checkable.
The path list is an allowlist, not an exclusion list. A denylist ships whatever
nobody thought to exclude, and this tree has a database key in it.
`architecture-evidence.txt` is the reviewer's index. It resolves a named symbol
list against the checkout and says plainly when a requested name does not exist.
It also re-runs the probe under every contradiction, so a claim and its grep
cannot drift apart.
One file is not verbatim. `docker-compose.yml` carries an uptime-kuma API key,
so a redacted copy ships in its place with that one value replaced. The script
diffs the two and aborts if anything else changed.
The scan at the end refuses to build on a credential-shaped hit rather than
printing a warning. Both of its first two versions were wrong in instructive
ways. The name filter deleted `internal/router/singletoken.go` for matching
`*token*`. The value scan flagged docker volume lines that name where a secret
would live and contain none.
## The authorization function as implemented
The reconstruction, at the one decision point that gates an act
(`internal/tool/tool.go:156`):
```
permit(tool, confirmed) =
row.status == "enabled" tool.go:164
AND tier != irreversible risk.go:74 VoiceMayRun:false
AND (tier == safe OR confirmed) risk.go:72,76
```
`tier` is `RiskOf(row)`. The reach is not an input: `Executor.Exec` takes
`(ctx, name, args, confirmed)` and no surface.
`confirmed` is unproven at this boundary too. The invariant that a confirmation
binds one capability, one target and an expiry lives in `pendingAct` and
`resolveConfirm`. `Exec` trusts the boolean.
The expression covers two of the three act paths. Hexis reuses it deliberately
(`cmd/mavend/ecosystem_acts.go:768`). The Praxis lifecycle path has no tier and
no confirm turn: `praxisItemAction.handle` calls straight through at
`ecosystem_acts.go:158`.
Behind the IPC boundary, `auth.Can(method, scope, params)` runs with
`scope.Surface` always `SurfaceCoreProcess` (`internal/auth/enrollment.go:65`)
and step-up held as one global timestamp that ignores `Scope`
(`internal/webauthn/session.go:38` and `:62`).
`auth` answers who may carry what authority. `tool` answers what effect a
capability has and what proof it demands. Those are orthogonal, not competing.
The decision combining them does not exist.
Two representations of reach exist and both are ignored. `server.go:198` only
defaults an empty `p.Surface`, so a client-asserted one survives and nothing
reads it. `server.go:148` hardcodes `Session.Surface`. Since `req.Surface` is
request payload on an unauthenticated wire, it must not become an authorization
input as it stands.